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The Nature of Grievance Arbitration
Introduction
Before plunging into the analysis of any phenomenon brought about by
complex human interaction it is helpful to portray an overview of the system
in which it has developed.
An industrial relations system is a concept derived from the interaction
of managers and their organizations, workers and their organizations and
finally governmental agencies. It is an analytical subsystem of an industrial
society on the same plane as an economic system can be considered a sub-
system of an industrial society.' Not only are they equivalent as subsystems
but their analytic purposes are identical. An industrial relations system is
therefore an abstraction developed in order to highlight the relationships of
the participants in a work place embraced by an industrial society. The
interaction of the participants results in the formulation of a complex of
rules, the character and content of which, are a function of the various
important contexts in which the system operates. The system might be the
nation, an industry or a small firm and the contexts within which each operate
are: 1) the technical context, 2) the market or budgetary contexts and,
3) the power relations and statuses of the actors. They are obviously inter-
related and "are bound together by an ideology of understanding shared by
all"2
*Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
'John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (1958) 7.
21d. at 16. The entire introduction relies heavily on chapters 1-4 in this text.
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Arbitration is an institution in such an industrial relations system, having
been fostered by the interaction of the parties as determined by the contexts.
It is important to realize that it is only one of many mechanisms existing in
the North American unionized industrial relations system and it is this system
or rather its many subsystems which is the subject matter of this paper. The
contexts in which arbitration operates determines its capabilities to a large
extent. However in a discussion solely related to this institution it is possible,
indeed probable, to exaggerate its importance and capabilities. This is the
pitfall I want to avoid.
Grievance arbitration is a dispute settling mechanism with a peculiar
structure and capacity for accommodating particular conflicts related to the
interpretation and enforcement of the collective agreement. It does not stand
in isolation as the only machinery existing to entertain differences of opinion
and outlook. Collective bargaining and grievance administration are dispute
settling mechanisms with distinctly different capabilities and structures. It is
important to grasp the essential function of each mechanism, the circum-
stances in which each does this function best, as well as the institutional limi-
tations and interdependence of all such mechanisms. A functional analysis
allows for an informed allocation of responsibilities as well as contributing
to an understanding of particular problems in the world of arbitrators.
The contexts in which the industrial relations system functions are
critical to an examination of the parameters of grievance arbitration. The
technical context, if it happens to be a complex one, may spawn a
multiplicity of rules and norms to solve the problems encountered. These
rules may become codified in a collective agreement. These are the rules
that grievance arbitration is intended to administer; yet the character and
content will be initially fixed by the technological environment and subject
to its change. Technical conditions as well as budgetary and market con-
straints determine the size of the system which in turn affects the extent and
content of the rules. Complex work assignment, promotion, transfer, and
compensation rules are therefore subject to these contexts. The technical
context also determines the strategic importance of a job and in turn the bar-
gaining power of the occupant.
The market context (product market) is dependent on the number of
competitors, ease of entry into the market, standardization of the product,
availability of substitute products and sources of supply as well as postpona-
bility of demand, to mention a few determinants. The freedom or lack of
freedom created by competition will affect the content and extent of the rules
in a collective agreement. The existence and content of compensation rules,
and subcontracting limitations are examples of this influence.
Labour market conditions such as the ratio of labour costs to total costs
underlie the concern of management with labour costs and in turn affect
the rules which govern job performance.
In short, the technological and market contexts determine the size,
strength and problems of the parties. To a very large extent, grievance
arbitration is presented with a given environment. This perspective suggests
that arbitrators can have little influence on the occurrence of conflict created
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by the contexts. Solutions to such problems revolve around altering the
contexts or softening their impact on the parties. Arbitration is institutionally
unsuited to perform either task. Negotiation and governmental manpower
programs are more effective devices. 3
Similarly the power relations of the actors and their status' in the
industrial society will determine the existence and content of various rules.
These rules will have a real impact on the parties' abilities to deal with
problems. Governmental perception of the industrial sector has resulted in
legislation which controls and facilitates the interaction of workers and
management. North American government has legitimized and promoted
collective bargaining through legislation that has had a beneficial impact
on employee bargaining power in many sectors of the economy. 4
The relationship of the judiciary to the industrial relations system
has contributed to the framework of rules within which the parties, including
the arbitrator, must operate. To take an arbitration award to the courts for
enforcement necessarily submits the institution to the supervisory power of
the superior tribunal. The judicial perception of arbitral responsibility in an
industrial relations setting will be determinative of the official form of that
institution.
Grievance Arbitration
To-day grievance arbitration is the product of collective agreements
and legislation. It is intended to settle the disputes that arise during the term
of such agreements. The agreement may provide for arbitration to deal with
all disputes that may arise during its term or as is more normal the case,
for those disputes relating to the interpretation, application or administration
of the agreement during its term. Grievance arbitration is therefore to be
contrasted with interest dispute arbitration exemplified by a compulsory or
voluntary arbitration of a wage negotiation dispute. 5 Grievance arbitration as
opposed to arbitration per se is a relatively recent phenomenon in the
industrial relations systems of both Canada and the United States. Arbitration
3I firmly believe that arbitrators must be cognizant of the existence and the
implication of these contextual constraints. Other institutions, internal and external to
the system, are more appropriately designed to deal with many problems that periodi-
cally face arbitrators and promote in them feelings of despair, indirection or the urge
to forge in new directions. For an excellent analysis of the development and structure
of the "internal labor market" within which arbitration operates see, Doeringer and
Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis (1970).
4 Yet in Canada the statutory requirement of an absolute no strike clause in every
collective agreement has created arbitral problems when the arbitration clause is not
co-extensive. This problem although a product of bargaining rather than legislation,
exists in the United States as well, making the continuing duty to bargain somewhat
illusory.
5The fundamental distinction is the existence of a collective agreement dealing
with and creating standards in relation to particular subjects. When a dispute arises
with regard to the subject matter, these standards are interpreted and applied to authori-
tatively settle the issue. Such standards do not exist in interest dispute adjudication and
intractable problems evolve due to their absence. However it must be recognized that
if the parties consent to the arbitration of all disputes and the collective agreement is
not totally comprehensive, an arbitrator may be left without standards for particular
subject matter. The problems of interest dispute arbitration are then present.
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per se predates grievance arbitration by centuries, specifically in the area of
commercial dealings." Its apparent popularity stemmed from a sense of inade-
quacy of the common law rules regulating mercantile transactions. The deve-
lopment of grievance arbitration in the twentieth century may well have
been a product of a similar impulse in that the courts had refused to have
anything to do with collective agreements. In many states of the United
States and in Canada the collective agreement was initially not an enforce-
able document in a court of law.7 The only way to enforce it was by economic
conflict and this proved extremely impracticable from both an employee and
employer point of view. Hence in the anthracite coal mining industry and
in the hosiery industry grievance arbitration systems evolved to deal with
disputes arising out of the day to day administration of the collective agree-
ment." However the great impetus for the acceptability, workability and legi-
timacy of grievance arbitration did not arrive until after the War Labour
Boards of both Canada and the United States required that grievance disputes
be settled without a stoppage of work.9
Prior to and even after the legislative imprimatur of collective bargaining
physical violence was not uncommon. The legislation required management to
bargain with a collective yet attitudes remained unchanged. Even today some
bargaining is only grudgingly undertaken and accompanied by hostility and
mistrust. But generally, as unions became more experienced in "table" strategy
and management became conditioned to their presence, collective agreements
became more complex and sophisticated. From skeletal agreements dealing
solely with compensation, the collective agreement today is reminiscent of
sections extracted from tax manuals and just as intricate in operation. The
development of this institution to a stage where it is capable of accomplishing
the tasks for which negotiation is appropriate has had a concommitant impact
on grievance arbitration. It might well be argued that in the early develop-
ment of the industrial relations systems we now know, grievance arbitration
0Surges, Commercial Arbitration, (1930); see also Dawson, A History of Lay
Judges (1960); Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process (1965) at 10; Witte, Historical
Survey of Labor Arbitration (1952); Jones, Power and Prudence in the Arbitration of
Labor Disputes (1964), 11 UCLA L. Rev. 675, 701.
7 For the United States, Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature
and Scope, [1949] Wash. U.L.Q.3; Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in
the American Legal Systems, (1941), 39 Mich. L Rev. 1109; Rice, Collective Labor
Agreements in American Law, (1930-31), 44 Harv. L. Rev. 572.
For Canada, Curtis, The Development and Enforcement of The Collective
Agreement (1966).
8 Fleming, supra note 6.
(United States: War Labor Board, Exec. Order 9017; see Freidin and Ulma,
Arbitration and the War Labor Board (1945), 58 Harv. L. Rev. 309; Fleming, supra
note 6.
Canada: P.C. 1003(1944); see Carrothers, Labor Arbitration in Canada (1961) 7;
Carrothers, Collective Bargaining in Canada (1965) 357; Woods, "Public Policy and
Grievance Arbitration in Canada", Developments in American and Foreign Arbitration
(1968) 19.
In Canada the compulsory nature of grievance arbitration was maintained by the
virtual duplication of P.C. 1003 in provincial labour relations legislation. In the United
States it became and remains strictly voluntary.
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had to undertake tasks for which it was ill-suited.' 0 Skeletal agreements
grudgingly made could scarcely be documents lending themselves to a mean-
ingful yet restrained elaboration of provisions. Arbitrators were forced into
interest dispute arbitrations during these early days. But today despite the
maturity of collective bargaining and industrial relations sophistication, a
debate lingers on the proper role of grievance arbitrators. Few participants
in the diologue appear cognizant of the institutional limitations of arbitration
or the capabilities of other dispute resolution processes."
The Scope and Limitation of the Arbitrator's Role
The debate is polarized around two central themes of grievance arbitra-
tion.12 One group advocates that the arbitrator must conduct himself as a
judge. However there is an important ambiguity in their perception of the
judicial function. Mechanistic or positivistic literalism has been adopted by
one faction of this central theme emphasizing the need for predictability,
reliance and reckonability of the written word. The other related faction has
emphasized a need for a purposive approach to the collective agreement and
a felt need to look beneath the surface of the words in order to find the parties
"intention". This latter faction is not opposed to elaborating these purposes
or principles in order to effect the distilled intentions of the parties to the
contract.
The other central theme visualizes the arbitrator as a labour relations
"physician"; but again there is ambiguity in the precise definition of his role.
10 This idea is developed in Killingsworth and Wallen, "Constraint and Variety in
Arbitration Systems", from Labour Arbitration: Perspectives and Problems (1964)
at 56.
"1 Consider the conflicting utterances in the following Canadian and United States
decisions: United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., (1960)
363 U.S. 574, 581-2; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,
(1960) 363 U.S. 593, 597; R. v. Arthurs, Exp. Port Arthur Shipbuilding (1967),
2 O.R. 45, 53. This difference of opinion is not confined to judicial circles. See Fuller,
"Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator" from Collective Bargaining and the Arbitra-
tor's Role (1962), 8; Taylor, "Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration,"
from The Profession of Labor Arbitration (1957), 20; Shulman, Reason, Contract and
Law in Labor Relations (1955), 68 Harv. L Rev. 999 and Jones, supra note 6.
12 My perception of legal reasoning and institutional limitations has been influenc-
ed by Professor Paul C. Weiler. The models developed borrow heavily from his work
in legal reasoning in general and labour arbitration in particular. See also Professor
Fuller's writing and Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (Tentative ed.) (1958). See
Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, (1968), 46 Can. Bar. Rev. 406,
Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making, (1970), 48 Can. Bar. Rev. 1;
Weiler, The Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative Versions (1969), 19 U of T.
L. 16; Weiler, "Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change," Task Force on Labour
Relations, Study No. 6 (1969).
The following articles represent the writings, in addition to the above, upon
which the models of this first section draw.
Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations in Labor Arbitration (1960), 14 Rutgers
L. Rev. 217; Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration (1957), 72 Harv. L Rev. 1482;
Cox, The Legal Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (1958), 57 Mich. L.
Rev. 1; Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, [1963] Wis. L Rev. 3; Jones,
supra note 6; Shulman, supra note 11; Summers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process
with a Public Function (1965), 34 Rev. Jur. U. Puerto Rico 477; Taylor, supra note
11; Taylor, The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes (1951), 49 Mich. L. Rev. 787.
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Some supporters of this notion feel the essence of the arbitrator's function
lies in mediation. Long run labour relations goals are considered achievable
only by compromise through continual negotiation. Others rallying under this
banner feel that an industrial policy-maker's stance must be taken at a time
when so much reliance is placed on arbitration and at a time when its public
impact cannot be ignored.
These complex and somewhat interrelated notions can be synthesized
into three theoretical models.'8 It is admitted that each model is an artificially
pure formulation. No one arbitrator could be exclusively identified with a
single proposition. However the existence of mixed forms of arbitration
does not subvert the efficacy of these models. It is only through an isolation
of the particular forms of the arbitral process that one can detect basic insti-
tutional requirements. There is an inextricable relationship between the job
we ask arbitration to do and the design of that framework within which the
arbitrator must operate.
The advantages of arbitration are claimed by all three models. That
is, each model emphasizes' 4 an inexpensive speedy remedy devised by an
expert who has been appointed by the parties. The expense factor is generally
less than the comparative service in a judicial setting, but this may vary
depending on the nature of the dispute. Nevertheless, the fact that the union
pursues the action and pays the bill creates benefits to an individual grievant
not unlike a legal aid programme. Speed is the essential factor. Dispute reso-
lution in a dynamic industrial context is required to give quick, definitive
solutions. Informality contributes to a healthy attitude in dealing with the
continual differences that will arise in symbiotic relationships. Hopefully it
encourages a more relaxed and trusting atmosphere. At the very least a
business like interest in the settlement of a particular dispute without the
excessive dramatization of the civil and criminal public processes is present.
The acceptability of the arbitrator derives from his mutual appoint-
ment by the parties affected by his decision, quite unlike the imposition of
public tribunals. This facilitates the selection of people who are familiar with
and competent in an industrial relations system.' 5 Finally the decision-
making in grievance arbitration permits the development and application of
expertise. Each model differs as to the implications this expertise has for
the forms and limits of the decision-making process. The adjudicative model
would argue that to describe arbitrators as "experts" is not to suggest that
they are industrial economists, psychologists or sociologists. The arbitrator
is not an industrial consultant. Rather, he is an expert in the interpretation
and application of the legal regime embodied within the notion of a collective
agreement. He is familiar with the vocabulary used in collective agreements
and their operational premises. He is also familiar with the legitimacy of
possible reasoning sources and has a good grasp of what the parties except
from him and the agreement. The advocates of adjudication assert that this
18 See Weiler, The Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative Versions (1969),
19 U of T LJ. 16; Weiler, Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change, Task Force on
Labour Relations, Study No. 6 (1969).
1
4 Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process (1958) (Tentative ed.) 340.
15 Hays has questioned the impartiality of an arbitrator so appointed. Hays, Labor
Arbitration: A Dissenting View (1966) 62.
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form of expertise is demanded by the institutional structure of grievance
arbitration. Something less or something more frustrates the efficient func-
tioning of arbitration and impairs the utility of related institutions within the
system.
The mediational and policy-making models of grievance arbitration are
in fundamental opposition to such a limited interpretation of expertise.
The touchstone of the mediational model is mutual acceptability. It is
a means of furthering the deified end of industrial peace.16 Only through
mutual trust and understanding will conflict be eliminated and not merely
postponed. Mediation envisages continuous collective bargaining rejecting
the distinction between agreement negotiation and administration.17 Standing
unwisely on "apparent" rights, negotiated at a time when the present pro-
blems were unforeseeable is harmful to industrial relations in the long run.
This is not to deny that the collective agreement is a source of guidance for
long run mutual objectives. It is rather to assert that unwise reliance on strict
legal rights is lethal in any symbiotic relationship.
This model perceives the arbitrator as a conduit to facilitate meaning-
ful communication. He is to dig up the real industrial relations facts and
persuade either party to lose gracefully or restrain from unwise reliance on
a contract right. It is a pragmatic process. However the model has one
significant factor pure mediation lacks. This is the authority to decide which
flows from arbitration as the replacement of the strike during the term of the
agreement.
A few basic assumptions about the natures of legal reasoning and the
collective agreement underpin this model.'8 One assumption perceives legal
reasoning based on enacted rules as a sterile mechanistic reliance on the
written word of the contract. Such reliance and consequent development of
precedent results in decisions that are oblivious to the industrial relations
significance of the dispute. The second assumption focuses on the nature of
16 This model is a product of the writings of Fuller, supra note 16; Shulman,
supra note 7; Taylor, supra note 16 and Weiler, supra note 16.
"By this view the arbitrtaor has a roving commission to straighten things out, the
immediate controversy marking the occasion for, but not the limits of, his inter-
vention. If the formal submission leaves fringes of dispute unsettled, he will
gladly undertake to tidy them up. If the arguments at the hearing leave him in
doubt as to the actual causes of the dispute, or as to what the parties really
expect of him, he will not scruple to hold private consultations for his further
enlightenment. If he senses the possibility of a settlement, he will not hesitate
to step down from his role as arbitrator to assume that of mediator." Fuller,
supra note 16 at p. 4.
"At any event, especially in new contract cases, they frequently agree upon the
tripartite arbitration board with a majority vote required for a decision. Three-
party bargaining is thus substituted for two-party bargaining and the 'outsider'
has been brought in to act as a kind of mediator with a reserve power." (em-
phasis added) Taylor, supra note 16, at p. 794.
17 Taylor, supra note 12, p.795.
18 These very assumptions will be examined and if done effectively, the legitimacy
of this model will be destroyed. It appears that these assumptions are a product of
judicial intervention which brought strict, literalistic interpretations with it. However
there is no reason to accept such analysis as reflective of the potential of legal reason-
ing or to argue that arbitrators would proceed this way.
1971]
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the agreement. The parties' relationship is a continuous and complex one
and it is impossible to embody in the agreement all of the understandings in
relation to the conditions of employment and management. To rely exclusively
on such a document is naive and unwise. The arbitrator must rove in a con-
tinuous hiatus inducing compromise, declaring settlements as awards thereby
avoiding internal union constituency problems and enacting decisions which
make industrial relations sense, given his familiarity with the parties and
their mutual trust in him. Arbitration is a voluntary process. Either party can
rid itself of the arbitrator' 9 and no enforcement mechanism should be re-
quired.20
This model requires a peculiar institutional structure. The arbitrator is
vital or central to its makeup. He should be of a permanent chairman type
thereby facilitating complete knowledge of the parties and fostering mutual
trust. Secondly, the environment should have a minimal legal structure. This
will insure against unwise reliance on rights. Finally there must be an un-
differentiated authority between those people who negotiate the agreement
and those who administer its day to day operation. This will facilitate com-
munication and allow for conclusive settlement.
Certain problems arise from the structure of this model. Is the concept
feasible? The parties have failed to agree at the lower reaches of the grievance
process. The mediator encourages a settlement by threatening to decide.
21
Does a coerced agreement accomplish mutual and lasting acceptability?
22
Secondly, what is the impact of mediated grievances on interdependent insti-
tutions? If collective bargaining is perceived as a mechanism of social ordering,
will reliance on negotiated agreements be affected? The parties may cease to
regard collective bargaining as a meaningful exercise if reliance on the
agreement is frustrated. Responsibility in bargaining may be discouraged,
relying on the arbitrator as a supermanager.23 Thirdly, contract administration
19This notion dominates Judge Hays' perception of the process, prompting his
Draconian solution. Hays, Labor Arbitration: A Dissenting View (1966) 62.20 Shulman, supra note 11.
21 It'is implicit in both Taylor's and Shulman's writings that this is the motivating
force or impetus of settlement. See Taylor, supra note 12; Shulman, supra note 11, 1923.
22 Carl Stevens has developed this "threat of decision" into a sophisticated arbi-
tration model which is designed to operate in 'interest dispute' areas. In such areas,
because there exists no standards for decision the arbitrator is pressured into splitting
the difference between the two parties' proposals in lieu of no other criterion for a just
result. The parties react to this by exaggerating their demands in an effort to achieve
a greater gain when the "split" is made. All "real" negotiating is absent because each
party feels the "split" will be a better package than he could obtain otherwise.
In 'normal' negotiating, settlement pressure or a 'contract zone' is generated by
one's bargaining power as reflected in one's potential ability to inflict the costs of
disagreement on the other party. The uncertainty apparent in the reciprocal perception
of each party's capacity generates both agreement and disagreement. Disagreement con-
tinues until some clarity in perception is achieved. These pressures are absent if arbi-
tration as opposed to economic conflict is the terminal point in private negotiation.
Stevens suggests that these pressures can be restored or simulated by 'either/or' arbi-
tration and by minimizing any certainty in the arbitration process. It should be under-
stood that this model has one purpose only; to make the parties settle prior to arbitra-
tion. See Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining? (1966), 5
Industrial Relations 38; See generally Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining
Negotiations (1963); Brown, "Interest Arbitration", Task Force on Labour Relations,
Study No. 18 (1969), (Canada); and Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960) 143.
28 Fuller, supra note 12, 39.
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may be adversly affected. The parties may cease to make a conscious effort
to settle the disputes prior to arbitral intervention. Will arbitration operate
effectively under such pressure?24 Lastly, will the integrity of the arbitration
suffer if mediating efforts fail and the arbitrator is forced to decide?
This policy making model is concerned with the public nature and
responsibility of grievance arbitration.25 It is supported by a philosophy that
emphasizes the public nature of the modern corporation and the industrial
union.26 There is a felt need to be receptive to public goals rendering the
private origin of corporations, unions and arbitration insufficient to justify a
claim of absolute freedom. In Canada grievance arbitration is effectively
compelled by statute27 and in the United States it is statutorily recommended
241 am not arguing that mediation or conciliation is inappropriate per se. My
position is that it is inappropriate for the arbitrational institution to perform such a
function. A separate mediational mechanism might prove extremely functional, if it
were incorporated into the contract administration machinery. Under present conditions
it is likely that premature positions are taken creating intransigence notwithstanding
the merit of the issue. Conciliation machinery might well facilitate communication in
a facesaving way, eliminating the need or compulsion to go to arbitration.
25 This model is derived from Blumrosen, Public Policy Consideration in Labor
Arbitration, supra note 12; E. Jones, Power and Prudence in Arbitration, supra note 6;
Sumers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process with a Public Function, supra note 12;
Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision Making, supra note 12; Weiler, Labour Arbi-
tration and Industrial Change, supra note 12.
Q.E.D. #5 -
The decisions of the labor arbitrator, in the ancient tradition of his peers, (1)
should conform to the clearly expressed intent of the parties to the agreement,
but (2) should conform only so long as that intent remains with the bounds of
generally deducible public policy, but (3) absent the guidance of the parties,
and on occasion despite it, should reflect contemporary community attitudes of
what is fair in procedure and equitable in result. Jones, supra note 6, 741.
26The public nature of these institutions and concommitant responsibilities are
exhaustively developed in A. A. Berle, Jr. and Gardener C. Means, The Modern
Corporation (1932); Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (1954); Galbraith,
The New Industrial State (1967); Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (1960).
27 Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, C.L.I., S. 125; Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A.
1970, C. 196, S.78.
British Columbia, Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 205; as amended by
S.B.C. 1961, c. 31; 1963, c. 20; as amended by the Mediation Commission Act, 1968,
c. 26; 1970, c. 16, s. 22.
Manitoba, Labour Relations Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L 10 as amended by S.M. 1970,
c. 46; 1971, c. 60; 1971 c. 86, s. 23.
New Brunswick, Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 124 as amended by
S.N.B. 1953, c. 21; 1956, c. 43; 1959, c. 56; 1960, c. 45; 1961, c. 52; 1966, c. 73, s. 18.
Newfoundland, Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1952, c. 258 as amended by S.N.
1959, No. 1; 1960, No. 58; 1963, No. 82; 1966, No. 39; 1967, No. 12; 1968; No. 71, s.19.
Nova Scotia, Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 311 as amended by S.N.S. 1968,
c. 59; 1969, c. 79; 1970, c. 5 1971, c. 70, s. 19.
Ontario, Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 242, s. 37.
Prince Edward Island, The Industrial Relations Act, S.P.E.I., 1971, c. 35, s. 36.
Quebec, Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 141 as amended by 1965, c. 14; 1968, c. 19;
1968, c. 45; 1969, c. 40; s. 88-90. (supra note 205)
Saskatchewan is the lone exception. Arbitration is not required nor is a no strike-no
lock out clause mandatory as in all the other jurisdictions.
However, if arbitration is provided for in the collective agreement the provision
must be implemented. The Trade Union Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.87 as amended by 1966,
c. 83; 1968, c. 79; 1969, c. 66, s. 23A, 23B.
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to the parties.28 Arbitration is required as a primary source of relief for both
parties where available.29 Once an award is rendered it is somewhat insulated
from judicial review.30 The remedial authority of the arbitrator is pervasive.
It embraces the ability to order specific performance of a contractual provision
of employment as well as the ability to award substantial monetary damages.31
Awards rely on public mechanisms of enforcement backed by the sanctions
of the state. 82 Finally arbitration has expanded into areas of concurrent
jurisdiction with the labour boards, suggesting that policies underlying the
appropriate legislation must be fulfilled by the arbitral process.33
This model concludes that in effect, grievance arbitration is a statutory
tribunal. In Canada this is a drastic admission justifying the present pene-
trating judicial review. In the United States this notion is buttressed by the
public deference accorded to privately initiated tribunals.
It is no longer adequate to gauge a decision by the degree of mutual
acceptability engendered in the parties.3 4 The arbitrator must exercise
restraint in the relying upon conceptual reasoning derived from the agreement
and contract doctrine. The standard of a decision must be its functional
relationship to what the arbitrator believes to be the appropriate goals of
the industrial society. The agreement is not an illegitimate source of reason-
ing; but neither is it definitive. If it is inconsistent with public policy evidenced
by a statute or by widely held community views it must give away. The
materials for guiding the arbitrator must be unlimited.35
28 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 203(d), 29 U.S.C. 173(d)
(1964).
29 Canada
Elkington and the Wallace Barnes Company Ltd. (1961) C.L.L.C. 16, 198
(O.L.R.B.); Boivon v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, 1966 O.L.R.B. Oct. Mon.
Report 513; Acadia Pulp and Paper Ltd. (A Division of Atlantic Sugar Refineries
Co. Ltd.) v. International Brotherhood of Pulp Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, Local
678 et al, (1970), 70 C.L.L.C. 14,036 (N.B.S.C.-Q.B.D.)
United States
Dubo Manufacturing Corp. (1963) 142 N.L.R.B. 431; Spielberg Mfg. Co. (1955)
112 N.L.R.B. 1080; Carey v. Westinghouse (1964) 375 U.S. 261.
80The second part of this paper is devoted to examining the extent of such
deference.
81 Palmer, The Remedial Authority of the Arbitrator, [1960] Current Law and
Social Problems 125; Imbleau v. Laskin, Ex Parte Polymer Corp., [1962] S.C.R. 338;
Matter of Publisher's Association of New York City v. Mail Deliverer's Union (N.Y.
Sp. Ct. 1968) 59 L.C. 51, 985.
3 2 Labor.Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) (1964) 301, 29 U.S.C. 185.
In Canada either the labour legislation of the respective jurisdictions provide for
enforcement - Alta., S. 78; Ont., S. 37; Que., s. 81, 89; Sask., 11(1), 23, 23A(c) or the
arbitration legislation is reverted to.
33 Canada: John Inglis & Co. Ltd. (1952), C.L.LC. 17,049 (O.L.R.B.)
United States: Carey v. Westinghouse, supra note 29; Jones, supra note 6, 763.
3 4 States Jones, supra note 6, 763: It simply is not a "proper conception of the
arbitrator's function" to say that he draws his judicial life solely from the collective
agreement, that he cannot be considered to possess greater powers than those expressly
or by necessary implication conferred upon him by the parties in their collective
agreement.
35 Jones, Id. 743. Jones has isolated at least five "communities" that will give direc-
tion to the arbitrator.
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This model espouses a decision-making process that is essentially prag-
matic while conscious of such values as the maintenance of production, the
continued viability of collective bargaining and the responsibility to a wider
political community. The key aspect of this model is that it will decide issues
not reached by any meaning honestly attributed to the collective agreement.3 6
Managerial rights disputes are a paradigm illustration of the operation of this
model. It is implicit in the reasoning of these decisions that the decision-
makers are of the opinion that the legal system has delegated to them the
power of making authoritative binding decisions in disputes which are of
critical concern to the parties and to the industrial relations system as a whole.
Furthermore any innovation that is unacceptable is thought to be only tem-
porary in light of instantaneous impeachment. In any event a decision ren-
dered with due regard to its industrial relations significance is better than no
decision at all.37 The watch word of this model is discretion in the "strong
sense".38 It must be exercised in the light of public policy and the industrial
relations requirements. Like the mediator, the industrial policy-maker accepts
the incomplete nature of the collective agreement and perceives legal reason-
ing as mere obfuscation of the unbridled discretion behind mechanistic
doctrines that fail to deal with the needs of an industrial society.
Once again the disagreement centers on the institutional design of
arbitration and the discussion parallels the debate pertaining to the limits of
judicial action. Yet arbitral enactment must have a more compelling justi-
fication because of its patent private origin. Should one accept a potential
public function of arbitration, how is the arbitrator to get the information
and data necessary to make an informed choice in these areas? The problem
lies in a limitation of tools. He hears only the parties to the specific dispute
and in a dispute over an issue created by the subcontracting of work for
example, this is inadequate. In such a case the arbitrator must recognize
that if he is going to make an "authoritative value judgment" he must be
responsive to all parties affected. He should consider the immediate disput-
ants, the party to whom the work has been subcontrated and his employees as
well as the conflicting public interests of employment security and continued
economic production. Is this possible? Similarly in the area of a public policy
embodied in a contrary statute, what information and tools will he need to
evaluate its significance? There are other institutions that perform these
functions more efficiently operating on a day to day basis in relation to such
issues.39 Finally, one must have regard to the parties of the collective
861n the Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Boston (Arbitration Award 1949)
in Cox and Bok, Cases and Materials on Labor Law (1969) 543 is a classic example of
this approach.
37 Jones, supra note 6, 788.
38 Dworkin, The Model of Rules (1967), 35 U. of Chli. L. Rev. 14. In this article
and in Dworkin, Judicial Discretion (1963), 60 J. of Phil. 624, two notions of discre-
tion are developed in the light of the obligatory or permissive use of principles. The
former can be considered "weak" while the latter is said to describe discretion in the
"strong" sense. Essentially this model adopts this latter notion of discretion.
39 This form of analysis will be undertaken in the second part of the paper to
arrive at a meaningful allocation of responsibility between the courts and arbitration.
But, as we shall soon see, it applies with equal legitimacy in establishing the capacities
and limitations of arbitration in relation to other institutions within the industrial system.
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agreement. Have they really conferred a definitive power of decision in "any"
dispute that arises? What weight does the policy of freedom to contract have
in all of this?40 Little responsibility to deal with difficult issues is encouraged
in the parties when the collective agreement is viewed in this light. The
policy making model is based upon presuppositions that may be erroneous.
The institutional design of arbitration may not be appropriate to effect such
ambitious objectives and an attempt to do so may impede the effectiveness
of both arbitration and other related institutions.
The essential feature of the adjudicative model is its reliance on the
institutional structure of a decision-making process as a control on the sub-
stantive aims it can achieve. 41 Arbitration is only one of many modes of
social ordering and Professor Fuller has pointed out that the characteristic
feature of any such mode lies in the manner by which the affected parties
participate.42 Each mode derives its legitimacy and acceptability from the
peculiar form in which affected parties participate in the decision-making
process. These modes of social ordering designed to accommodate such
participation malfunction when they undertake problems that impede such
participation. A fortiori, these forms of participation must be preserved if
the long-run viability and integrity of a particular institution is to be main-
tained. This entails restraint on the part of those controlling an institution.
An arbitrator presented with a problem that cannot accommodate the
effective participation of the parties through an adversary process, should
defer to some other more appropriately designed institution. At the very least
he should be conscious of the institutional costs incurred in dealing with
the issue.
The adjudicative model of grievance arbitration conceives the presenta-
tion of proofs and reasoned argument to an impartial decision-maker who
makes decisions on the basis of this presentation as the form of participation
essential to the functioning of arbitration. The adversary process may be
formal or informal; but its viability depends on maximizing the participation
of the affected parties in the decision-making process. Furthermore, Professor
Fuller points out that "[lt is important that an arbitrator not only respect
the limits of his office in fact, but that he also appear to respect them". 43
40 Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(1963), 14 Lab. L.1. 1016; (1963-63), 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 467; Wellington, Labor and
the Legal Process (1968), champions this notion throughout his critique of judicial
intervention in the labour sector.
41This discussion of adjudication is more a distillation of Professor Weiler's lucid
writings on the area of adjudication than an original contribution by this writer. How-
ever, the following are other materials heavily relied upon. Fuller, The Morality of Law
(1964); Fuller, The Anatomy of Law (1968); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication (unpublished); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitr'ator, [1963]
Wis. L. Rev. 3; Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (tent. ed. 1958); Mishkin and
Morris, On Law in Courts (1965).
The essence of the judicial function lies not in the substance of the conclusion reached,
but in the procedures by which that substance is guaranteed. One does not become a
judge by acting intelligently and fairly, but by accepting procedural restraints designed
to insure - so far as human nature permits - an impartial and informed outcome of
the process of decision. Fuller, "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator" Id. p. 18.
42 Fuller, Forms and Limits of Adjudication, Id. p. 18.
43 Id. 44.
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This assurance is developed by the rationality of the decision-making process.
Claims of right are made by the parties on the basis of the pre-existing
rules contained in the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator is
required to apply these rules in a rational way in order to resolve the dispute
submitted to him. His function is conceived as one of "discovering" the
implication of these standards. Meaningful participation by affected parties
requires the submission of a specific concrete dispute, an impartial decision-
maker, an adversary process and a pre-existing system of mutually accepted
standards to be utilized in the decision-making process.
To summarize the thesis of the adjudicatory model: the entire institu-
tional structure of arbitration; its incidence, access to it, mode of participa-
tion in it, the basis for decision, the nature of the relief available in it, are
all defined by and flow naturally from its function, which is to dispose of
private disputes arising out of primary conduct by granting relief to parties
on the basis of an evaluation of this conduct in the light of the legal standards
established by this agreement.44
The Collective Agreement: Its Nature and Scope
The advocates of both the mediation and policy-making models do not
deny the adjudicative structure of arbitration or the compelling nature of spe-
cific standards established by the agreement. They claim instead that the
adjudicative model does not defeat or even meet the logic of their position.
The error in strictly applying the adjudicatory model to grievance arbitration
lies in the inadequacy of existing standards contained in a collective agree-
ment. The presupposition of the adjudication model is the existence of a
comprehensive regime of specific legal rules (or provisions of a contract)
to be utilized by both the parties and the arbitrator. The nature of the col-
lective bargaining process creates an agreement which is ill-suited to such
a model. The antagonists assert that the collective agreement is inadequate as
a sole source of directives. 45 The skeletal or incomplete nature of the collective
agreement is due to a number of factors which presumably make it so unique
that traditional contractual doctrine is inapplicable. Furthermore, the use of
traditional legal reasoning is characterized as anathema to effective industrial
interaction. One unique fact is the large number of people regulated by
such an agreement. The greater the number of people involved and the more
complex the context in which they operate the more unlikely is the complete
44 See Paul Weiler's Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making (1968), 46 Can. B.
Rev. 406; Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can.B.Rev. 1, for an
analysis and justification of each constituent element of adjudication. Adjudication is
suited to solving claims of right. Many problems do not lend themselves to the appli-
cation of rules, principles or policies. These issues must be handled by other dispute
resolution institutions such as negotiation or pure managerial discretion.
45 Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of the Contract (1948),
48 Colum. L. Rev. 829; Taylor, supra notes 11 and 12; Shulman, supra note 12, Jones,
supra note 6, 742; See also supra note 7.
Professor Cox in The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (1958), 57 Mich.
L. Rev. 1; Reflections Upon Labour Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482; also highlights
the uniqueness of the collective bargaining agreement. However such peculiarities do
not drive him away from an adjudicatory model of grievance arbitration. Rather he
implores that an articulated and purposive approach be taken by arbitrators.
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codification of their interaction. This incompleteness is compounded by the
exigencies of the negotiating setting. "Eleventh hour" meetings are not con-
ducive to the clear-headed and astute draftsmenship required. It is not even
conducive to a thorough canvassing of all contingencies, given the wide range
of conduct that is to be governed. The symbiotic relationship of the parties
and the statutory obligation to bargain creates an atmosphere in which the
consequences of disagreement speak disaster to either party. At times hard
issues are often deliberately avoided or ignored while the contract must be
written in language recognizable to the men in the shop. In the end you are
left with, at worst, a totally incomplete document and at best, an industrial
constitution.46 Classical contract doctrine is inapplicable47 to each, and legal
reasoning is merely a charade to disguise an unfettered discretion in the
unwritten area of the agreement.48 To restrict your focus to the mere "bones"
of an agreement, given the general occurrence of a no-strike clause which is
generally not co-extensive with the arbitration clause, is normally to decide
for the employer. Legal reasoning is considered devoid of equity and con-
sonant with an attitude of letting "the chips fall where they may". 49
This is why the mediator and the policy-maker take the position they
do. Their perception of the agreement and legal reasoning leaves them at
large. They therefore seek the comfort and assistance of guidelines or at
least some rationale that will lessen the burden. 0 The mediator seizes upon
the acceptability of a decision to the respective parties as his guide. However
the adoption of this standard conceals a "sleight of hand". This is the reliance
upon the arbitrator's decision-making powers to "encourage" agreement. Is a
coerced settlement free from its own criticism that an adjudicatory decision
merely postpones conflict? 1 Mediation may have a destructive impact on the
very important and related institutions of collective bargaining and grievance
administration. Coerced compromise does not allow for reliance on bargained
provisions nor does it encourage creativity in the negotiation process. Private
social ordering gives way to continual third party intervention. As well,
mediation can be a slow drawn out affair. The wearing of two hats (mediator
and arbitrator) impedes the efficiency of each office. The mediator whose
pure function is to facilitate communication cannot achieve it with the resi-
dual power to decide to the prejudice of the party who is too candid. The
arbitrator with the power to decide, takes a position in mediation which if
unsuccessful becomes terribly difficult to shed in assuming the role of the
impartial arbiter. The integrity or morality of arbitration thereby suffers.8 2
The industrial policy maker supplies quite a different directive for
guidance in the unwritten area of the collective agreement. His is the further-
ance of industrial relation goals having regard to societal and party needs.
40 Chamberlain, Id. 834.
471d. 838.
4 8 Jones, supra note 6, 766.
40 Taylor, supra note 12, 794.
50 Friedman, On Legalistic Reasoning - A Footnote to Weber, [1966] Wis. I.
Rev. 148 in a somewhat positivistic fashion develops this notion.
51 Taylor, supra note 12, 793.
52 Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, supra note 12,43. Professor
Fuller characterizes such an existing dichotomy as parasitic, flourishing as does the
prostitute who owes her fortune (or misfortune) to the virtuous woman.
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As an expert in such matters he fashions a jurisprudence that will further
such ends. His real claim of right is that the parties and society generally
respect his judgment and defer to it. Is he right in this assumption? Do the
parties expect him to impose value judgments upon them where they have
failed to reach agreement? Is the arbitrator equipped to draw the territorial
boundary between such matters as job security or economic productivity?
The structure of arbitration is adversarial. Such a structure is not designed or
suitable for ascertaining the necessary information to make such determina-
tions.
However the advocates of adjudication are not content with solely
discrediting these two models. They argue that an astute appreciation of
both the collective agreement and legal reasoning allows for an efficient,
comprehensive and predictive ordering quite within the inistitutional limita-
tions of adjudication. Professor Fuller has said that there is nothing ineffably
peculiar to the interpretation of a collective agreement. Expertise is surely
required because the jargon of the agreement and the context in which it
operates are foreign to the typical judge. Arbitration allows for a speedy and
efficient briefing for any arbitrator who is deficient in some particular aspect
of a dispute.53 Professor Summers has recently responded to the contention
that the uniqueness of collective agreement renders traditional contractual
doctrine inapplicable.54 He suggests that such factors as the number of
people involved, incompleteness, compulsion to bargain and the symbiotic
nature of the parties' relationship are not peculiar to collective agreements
alone. Many kinds of contracts in the traditional sense, embody such features.
Insurance contracts apply to many people, and almost all agreements are
incomplete in some respect and many more so than a collective agreement.
Exclusive dealerships reflect a compulsory bargaining relationship. In fact the
symbiotic aspect of the collective agreement should facilitate mutual under-
standing rather than impede it. If the contract is an instrument of social
ordering, the collective agreement might well be the paradigm of its effecti-
veness. However Professor Summers did not therefore conclude that the
common law of contract should be utilized in the interpretation of collective
agreements. Rather his thesis was that specific contractual doctrine was only
applicable to the context in which it originated. Contract law had itself re-
cognized a lack of transferability by qualifying whole areas of transactions
and allowing a development of law applicable only to those areas (such
as insurance).
The term 'contract' describes a family of relationships, but within the family are
many genuses and the collective agreement is one genus in that family.
55
Certain principles of contract designed to accentuate and facilitate the
aspect of mutuality in an agreement were applicable to any agreement and
should be utilized to avoid diseconomies in a continual reconstruction of
53 Id. 12.
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universal principles.56 Professor Cox adds that some contractual rules are
helpful in providing the conceptual tools of analysis "even though the answers
are based in the functional character of the agreement." 57 Therefore this
suppletive law is to be utilized in a purposive way and where inapplicable or
inconsistent with industrial relations goals it should be abandoned. 58
The adjudicative model as well rejects the necessity for the negotiation
of specific contractual provisions intended to deal with specific fact situations.
The interpretation of a contract, a collective agreement or a constitution59
is more than merely a syllogistic enterprise. It could be argued that the
advocates of the other two models are positivists given their perception of
the nature of rules or contract provisions. Words are necessarily ambiguous
without regard to the context in which they are operative. They must be
construed and interpreted in light of the negotiating history, the past practice
of the parties and industrial relations common sense. The creation of rules,
be it statutory or contractual, is a purposive activity and therefore underlain
by principles and policies. 60 Purpose should be paramount when an arbitrator
construes, interprets and applies the standards and 'shared values' of the
parties. The provisions of the agreement are generalized attempts to deal with
industrial interaction and concommitant problems. The solutions are neces-
sarily abstract and incomplete. No legislature or negotiating committee is
omniscient. Provisions enacted are not to be read as theorems of Euclid but
5o Id. However full scale adoption would, he argues, result in a failure to deal
with concrete problems and manifest itself in either/or solutions totally inappropriate
for this context of application. (at 545).
Professor Cox has argued for a similar adaptation. Cox, Reflections Upon Griev-
ance Arbitration supra note 45, 1489.
57 Cox, Id.
58 The essence of contractual interpretation is to construct an informed objective
meaning. Rules such as parol evidence are being abandoned even in classical contract
interpretation because of the manifest disservice to this goal, see Farnsworth, "Meaning"
in the Law of Contracts (1967), 76 Yale L. J. 939.
50 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, supra note 45, 1493 and Chamber-
lain, supra note 55 as well as numerous other writers develop the constitutional analogy
of self-government. And it is in this field of statutory interpretation that the most
academic work has been undertaken as opposed to the conceptualizing of contractual
interpretation. Professor Farnsworth (id.) noted this while Hart and Sacks, supra
note 12 and Mishkin and Morris, On Law in Courts (1965) bear testament to the
validity of such an assertion.
G Rules are fairly concrete guides for decisions geared to narrow categories of
behaviour and prescribing narrow patterns of conduct. Principles are vaguer signals
which alert us to general considerations, that should be kept in mind in deciding disputes
under rules. So we decide under rules but in the light of principles. Hughes, Rules,
Policy and Decision-Making (1968), 77 Yale LJ. 411, 419. For this same development
see also Hart and Sacks, supra note 12, 166; Mishkin and Morris, supra note 59, 239;
Dworkin, The Model of Rules (1967), 35 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 14.
A classic application of the argument and its limitations can be found in Halback,
Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills and Trusts (1964), 52 Calif. L. Rev.
921.
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rather as underlain with purpose. 61 It is the arbitrator's function to engage in
a reasoned elaboration of these "standards" having regard to their purpose
in the light of the concrete problems with which he is faced. Cohen has
called this "filling in" function intelligent "legisputation". 62 The concept of
legal rules visualized by the mediation or policy-making models is far too
narrow to explain the material existing in the legal system and utilized in
legal reasoning. In hard cases lawyers have always resorted to other materials
to present principles or policy. This material differs from rules only in the
degree of direction it offers.63 Purpose, principle and policy (they are virtually
interchangeable) should be resorted to and utilized consistently so that the
parties can predict and rely upon their use in the adjudicative process. This
will enable the parties to participate vicariously in the reasoning process per-
petuating the rationality of the entire process. At the same time this will
facilitate private social ordering in other interrelated institutions within the
industrial relations system.
The position taken is quite obviously not a new one. It is one that cuts
between the extremes of legal positivism and legal realism. But it functions
well on a practical level as well as on a philosophical one. Purpose is derived
by going through the same mental process the draftsman did, in the light of
both the past practice of the parties and the specific industrial relations con-
text.64 The use of past practice to supplement the agreement is based on the
premise of looking for mutually accepted standards and purposes manifested
by the objective conduct of the parties. 5 The discretion the arbitrators have
61 See specifically Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, supra note 45, 1504;
and generally Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can.
B. Rev. 1; Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, (1968), 46 Can. B. Rev.
406. States Professor Weiler, in the former article (at 17):
If adjudication comes to represent the wooden, mechanical application of rules
without regard to the sense they are supposed to embody, people will lose their
respect for the legitimacy of these decisions and, perhaps, for the system of
which they are a part. There is enough evidence of a turning away from the
common law to systems of private business practice, arbitration, Ministerial discre-
tion, and so on, to support the view that the law must incorporate some sem-
blance of justice or reasonableness to be effective as law. One can achieve real
order, as opposed to paper order, only when one strives for good order.
62 Cohen, Judicial Legisputation and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning (1960-
61), 36 Ind. LJ. 414,417. Interstitial and molecular as opposed to molar have also been
descriptive of this phenomena. See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921);
Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922).
63 Hughes, supra note 60. 437; Dworkin, supra note 60, 22. This degree of direction
can be viewed as an element of weight allowing for balancing as opposed to the com-
pulsion of rules. Intelligent statutory interpretation can be viewed as a calculus of
principles and policies behind applicable standards. The following cases epitomize this
process: N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications Inc. (1944), 322 U.S. 111; Phelps Dodge
Corporation v. N.L.R.B. (1941), 313 U.S. 177; and Sidmay Ltd. v. Wehttam Invest-
ments (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 discussed in Weiler, Legal Values and Decision-
Making, supra note 61, 20. Recent writings of Dworkin and Hughes on this subject
can be found in The Antioch Review 151 and 223 (Summer 1970).
64Heydon's Case (Exchequer), 76 Eng. Rep. 637, is illustrative of the "mischief'
rule and is cited in Hart and Sacks, supra note 12, 1144 and Fuller, The Morality of
Law (1964) 82. The draftsman's thought processes are outlined in Hart and Sacks,
supra note 16, 200.
6
5 Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining
Agreements (1961), 59 Mich. L. Rev. 1017.
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is in the "weak" sense of weighing competing interpretations of rules, pur-
poses or principles in light of their industrial relations background. 6
The task of finding where the boundaries would have been drawn if the parties
who signed the contract had drawn them explicitly is then a problem of inter-
pretation within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator who is given power to decide
questions concerning the interpretation and application of the agreement. For it
is the agreement that draws the boundary line even though it does not draw it
expressly. The interpreter must remember that the contract goes a distance but
it also stops, because it is a product of competing wills and its policy inheres as
much in its limitations as in its affirmations. 67
Judicial Review of Grievance Arbitration in the United
States and Canada
Introduction
Part One of this paper was devoted to an elaboration of the nature of
grievance arbitration in light of the institutional structure of adjudication
and the natures of legal reasoning and the collective bargaining agreement.
Grievance arbitration as a dispute resolution institution within the industrial
relations system is suited to a particular task by virtue of its structure and its
relationship to other conflict solving institutions within the system. That task
is the settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation, construction
and application of the collective bargaining agreement. The limitations of this
particular function relate to the elaboration of standards mutually accepted
by the parties affected by the decision. Any abdication or transcedence of this
particular function has debilitating effects upon interrelated institutions within
the industrial relations system. To abdicate means to impose a burden on a
related institution that is ill-designed to perform these neglected tasks. To
transcend means to encroach upon the functions of these same interrelated
institutions for which the institutional structure of arbitration is ill-suited.
The second part of this paper will introduce the court into the set of
interrelated institutions that make up the theoretical abstract known as an
industrial relations system. The position of this paper, restated to include
the court, asserts that judges, arbitrators and the actual industrial participants
should act as partners in a collaborative effort to enhance the quality of order
within the industrial relations system. Their joint efforts should proceed on
the basis of a rational division of labour, each concentrating on the job he is
best capable of performing. What is best for each is determined by an
intelligent evaluation of the differing yet relevant institutional characteristics
each possesses.
To analyze this system and neglect the judiciary, so instrumental in
determining the character of the power context in which the entire industrial
relations system operates is naive as well as incomplete.68 Professor Cox
681Dworkin, supra note 38.
67 Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements (1958), 57 Mich.
L. Rev. 1, 35. For an excellent analysis of the limitations of the purposive approach see
the discussion on subcontracting in Weiler, Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change,
supra note 16. See also Gross, Value Judgments in the Decision of Labor Arbitrators
(1967-68), 21 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 55.68 Dunlop, supra note 1, c. 4. This context was briefly alluded to in the Introduction
to this paper.
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has noted that when a motion is filed to compel or stay arbitration or to
enforce or vacate an arbitration award, the court becomes a superior tribunal
and the arbitrator can only adjudicate as this body will permit. The court
may strengthen the institution by putting the force of law behind the arbi-
tration clause or award or shrivel and distort the process by excessive inter-
vention.69 There has been confusion of thought over the appropriate role of
arbitrators and judges in the area of grievance arbitration. The first half of the
paper was intended to outline a 'philosophy' of grievance arbitration in con-
cepts that can be articulated in rational terms instead of the historical asser-
tion that grievance arbitration is some mystical state of mind that only
members of the cult can experience.70 If the courts in North America accept
the legitimacy of this 'philosophy' and embrace the limitations of their own
institutional structures then functional order and efficiency in grievance arbi-
tration will be maximized. Judicial restraint will obviously depend on the
belief (probably acquired by experience) that arbitrators do act and only act
as outlined above. Whether they do or do not depends upon the arbitrators
themselves and the absence of pressures on them created by the malfunction-
ing of related institutions. Arbitrators can go a long way in initiating the
proper functioning of these related industrial institutions.
Historical Overview
There exists a continuum of possible state intervention in an industrial
relations system. A historical summary in the area of grievance arbitration in
North America demonstrates how instrumental the state can be.
Initially unions were treated as unlawful associations in unreasonable
restraint of trade.71 This view outlawed all their activities. But slowly their
status was transformed into that of a society lacking legal status while not
outright unlawful. The law recognized only individuals or corporations and
not unincorporated associations. This holding jettisoned judicial enforcement
of the collective bargaining agreement. 72 Until this position was altered by
legislation in both the United States and Canada one could state that collec-
tive agreement administration was a private process,73 utilizing a relatively
well-known and ancient dispute settling mechanism called arbitration. 4 How-
ever even private arbitration systems did not escape judicial scrutiny from
time to time. Should a party to such an agreement want to extricate himself
from the obligation or want an arbitration award enforced or vacated, re-
course was had to the courts. The court did respect the prior agreement of
69 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, supra note 45, 1487.
70 Id. 1489.
71 Russell v. Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, [1912] A.C. 421;
Polakoff v. Winters Garment Company (1928), 62 O.L.R. 40; Vegelahan v. Guntner,
167 Mass 92, 44 N.E. 1077. See Curtis, The Development and Enforcement of the Col-
lective Agreement (1966) 13.
72 United Mine Workers v. Strathcona Coal Company (1908), 8 W.L.R. 649 (Alta.
S.C.); Young v. Canadian Northern Railway Company, [1929] 4 D.L.R. 452; [1930]
3 D.L.R. 352; [1931] 1 D.L.R. 645. Generally see Curtis, supra note 71, 26 and Gregory,
supra note 7.
73 Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process (1968) 96.
74 Dawson, Fleming, Jones, Sturges, Witte, supra note 6.
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the parties if it was an agreement to submit a present or existing dispute to
arbitration. This was also the attitude if an award had been rendered and
one party was seeking enforcement. However the exceptions to these positions
were: 1) if the promise to arbitrate was an executory one relating to future
disputes75 or, 2) if the award rendered was subject to bias, fraud, arbitral
misconduct, denial of natural justice or without a fair hearing or in excess of
jurisdiction (encompassing arbitrability).
7
The status problems of trade unions while somewhat accommodated by
the stretching of existing judicial doctrine was finally ameliorated by legisla-
tion77 and the executory aspect of the arbitration promise was likewise ac-
commodated. 78 The common law position of judicial review of arbitration,
was codified and in some jurisdictions extended by permitting judicial inter-
vention on questions of law if the arbitrator or any one of the parties desired.79
A brief recitation of s. 10 of the United States Arbitration Act reflects the
legislative reaction in this area of review.
10 SAME; VACATION; GROUNDS; REHEARING
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause show, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehaviour by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter was sub-
mitted was not made.
e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made was not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct
a rehearing by the arbitrators.8 0
It is at this juncture that United States and Canadian arbitration history
bifurcates. Before considering the American departure in detail it is necessary
to make a few summary comments about the relationship between private
arbitration and judicial review.
Private Arbitration and Judicial Review:
A Conceptual Framework
Judicial review of private arbitration is subject to two conflicting
dictates. On the one hand, the parties have privately and voluntarily opted
71 Vynoir's Case, 4 Coke 81b - 82a (1609).
76 Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration (1958), 30 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 247, 249; Curtis, op. cit. supra note 71, 88.
77National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 as amended by 61 Stat. 136 and 73
Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. 141, s. 7, s. 301; The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202,
s. 3. (However, see Rights of Labour Act R.S.O. 1960. s. 3).
78 United States Arbitration Act 61 Stat. 669, 9 U.S.C.A. s.2, s.2. All provinces in
Canada have such legislation.
79See Curtis, supra note 71, 91.
80 Op. cit. supra note 78.
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for this extra-legal dispute settling mechanism. The courts should respect
their wishes in light of the "freedom to contract" and in the absence of any
conflicting, legitimate public policy considerations. On the other hand, the
very nature of this consensus demands that a specific promise should in fact
exist and that the process should be performed as agreed to and expected.
Some cynics have suggested that judicial hostility, manifested by an apparent
desire to protect their historical jurisdiction, has prompted the courts to
pursue this latter dictate with exceptional fervour: doubts being resolved
against the perceived encroaching institution. 8' In any event a vigorous review
of these systems has been pursued by the courts in both jurisdictions and in
an effort to prevent injustices have created injustices of their own. Traditional
doctrine has been applied to the industrial context with no thought of its
adequacy and despite considerable criticism.8 2 This has prompted the position
championed by Dean Shulman8s that the law should stay out of grievance
arbitration and reflected in Professor Fuller's statement:
The danger of an extention of judicial control over arbitration lies, not only in
the delays, costs and formalities it would entail, but in the kinds of interpretation
it would produce.8 4
Furthermore voluntary grievance arbitration is structured to accommodate
certain "shared values" in the industrial setting.85 This is why it is resorted to.
These values include speed and inexpensiveness. Speed is important because
the industrial entity is an ongoing enterprise which needs a quick resolution
of disagreement. Expense is important because of the number of the potential
disputes or grievances and their relative size if they can be quantified at all.
The technical expertise possessed by the adjudicator and his selection by
the parties for this reason is a dominant value. The complexity of jargon used
in agreements and the plant was canvassed in the first half of the paper.
Although not an insuperable barrier to overcome, the lack of stringent pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules of arbitration permit speedy access to back-
ground data should the adjudicator be deficient for one reason or another.
The relative informality of a grievance arbitration proceeding minimizes the
hostility in an adversary proceeding, accommodating the symbiotic relation-
ship of the parties. Lastly, an important value is the finality of decision. The
dispute is definitively resolved and the industrial enterprise can get back to
its normal operation. This value although related to speed incorporates the
notion of certainty.
Judicial review, on the other hand, maintains the integrity of the arbitral
process by eradicating fraud, bias, or patent misconduct. It maintains the
voluntary nature of grievance arbitration. A party cannot be coerced into
this setting nor can a party be left without a remedy at the hands of an
over-zealous adjudicator who has exceeded his mandate. However to fulfil
81 Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration (1959-60), 45 Cornell L. Rev. 519, 531.
82 Mayer, Judicial 'Bulls' in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration (1951),
2 Labor LJ. 502; Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional
Grounds, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 616; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or
Alice Through the Looking Glass (1952-53), 2 Buff. L. Rev. 1.
83 Shulman, supra note 12, 1024.
84 Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, supra note 12, 43.
85 Hart and Sacks, supra note 12, 340.
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these purposes the general values of the grievance process must be compro-
mised. Judicial review slows the dispute resolving process, aggravates econo-
mics and adds to formalities. The final and binding nature of an award is
likewise impaired.
Any evaluation of judicial intervention must first recognize that specific
instances of court review are justified. If an arbitrator has shown bias or
fraud it is quickly accepted that the general values of arbitration are not
absolute. Even though court intervention creates institutional costs, it is
accepted that these costs are outweighed by the benefit of court review in
this instance. There is a general overriding need to maintain the integrity of
the dispute resolving process. Should a court intervene for some other
objective the evaluative response may not be similar. Court review of an
interpretative error may result in a disposition no more compelling than the
arbitrator's original decision. Here the costs of judicial intervention would
outweigh the benefits. In such case a intervention would not be appropriate.8 6
Standards formulated to control judicial review of the grievance process
should reflect an awareness of these institutional costs and benefits.
Judicial Review of Grievance Arbitration
In the United States
The arbitration laws enacted in the various states, as well as the federal
United States Arbitration Act did not clearly apply to the grievance arbitration
of collective agreements.8 7 Some state arbitration laws explicitly provided
that they did not apply to collective agreements while others excepted per-
sonal service contracts or as the federal act, did not "apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce".88 Therefore the executory aspect
of the arbitration promise was not uniformly corrected in relation to collective
bargaining agreements. Whether an arbitration law did or did not apply,
the grounds for review of rendered awards was virtually the same because
this legislation merely codified the common law criteria.
In 1947 the Labor Management Relations Act created a new possibility.
Sec. 301 (a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship the
parties.89
It appeared that arbitration could therefore be compelled under the
Federal Arbitration Act90 once the union or the employer had invoked the
federal jurisdiction under Section 301. However, as previously noted, there is
80 For a report, related to administrative agencies, which lists the costs and benefits,
while avoiding any functional assessment of their weight, see: (McRuer Report, Ontario)
Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil Rights, v. 1, (1968) 275-79.
87 Cox, op. cit. supra note 76, 250.
88 United States Arbitration Act, 61 Stat. 669, 9 U.S.C.A. 1.
80 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 185 (1952).
0 Op. cit. supra note 88.
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an exception to that Act which might include collective agreements. In addi-
tion, the Act applies only to maritime transactions or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce. 1 Furthermore, the Norris La Guardia Act
92
appeared to bar equitable relief with its prohibition in relation to injunctions
in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute.
All of these problems were resolved in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama,93 a case involving a union request for the enforcement of
a promise to arbitrate in a collective bargaining agreement. It established,
The substantive law to apply in suits under 301(a) is federal law, which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Rules of decision
are to be underlying policies, from general legal principles, and from state
decisions which commend themselves to the federal courts, not as binding rules,
but as persuasive authority.94
Consequently this particular action did arise under the laws of the United
States and that in enacting section 301, "Congress adopted a policy which
placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate disputes, by implication
rejecting the common-law rule... -95 It was held that the Norris-La Guardia
Act did not bar a decree requiring a company to submit a dispute to arbi-
tration involving the application of a collective agreement.
That is as far as Lincoln Mills went. Federal law was to apply and that
which did not exist would be creatively fashioned. This left open an entire
spectrum of inquiries concerning the procedure and substantive standards to
be applied in the enforcement of an arbitration clause, and the enforcement
or vacation of an arbitration award. One could argue that the Federal
Arbitration Act applies. However the pregnant silence of the Supreme Court
in Lincoln Mills and in subsequent cases suggests to the contrary.9 This is
not to deny the existence of lower court decisions running both ways subse-
quent to Lincoln Mills.97 Professor Cox has reasoned that the best guess
would be in the negative on the basis of the Act's chronological position and
legislative history. It could be used for guidance in judicial reasoning as
could the common law rules existing in this area and the policy dictates of
Congress as evidenced in the National Labor Relations Act.98 In any event
it was clear that the court had reasoned its way to a penumbral position, and
was free to develop standards of enforcement and review consistent with
labour relations goals should it so desire.
91Id. s. 2.
9247 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 140 (1952).
93 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
94 Cox, supra note 76, 252.
95 Op. cit. supra note 93. See Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process (1968) 99
for a critique of the reasoning utilized in Lincoln Mills.
96 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co. (1960), 363
U.S. 564; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company
(1960), 363 U.S. 574; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car
Corporation (1960), 363 U.S. 593.
97 Pre-Lincoln Mills: Signal-Stat. Corp. v. Local 475, U.E.W., 235 F. 2d 298
(2d Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
Post-Lincoln Mills: Stereotypers, Local 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 68
L.R.R.M. 2561 (3d Cir. 1968); See Danau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration
(1969), 55 Va. L. Rev. 427.
9849 Stat. 449 as amended by 61 Stat. 136 and 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. 141 et seq.
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The predominant judicial attitude existing prior to Lincoln Mills is
reflected by the now infamous case of International Association of Machinists
v. Cutler Hammer.90 It is worthwhile to reproduce the per curiam opinion.
The clause of the agreement that 'the Company agrees to meet with the union
early in July, 1946 to discuss payment of a bonus for the six months of 1946'
can only mean what it says, that the parties will discuss the subject. While the
contract provides for arbitration of disputes as to the 'meaning, performance,
non-performance or application' of the provisions, the mere assertion by a party
of a provision which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words cannot
make an arbitrable issue.
It is for the Court to determine whether the contract contains a provision for
arbitration of the dispute tendered, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction the
Court must determine whether there is a dispute. If the meaning of the provision
of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything
to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration.100
(emphasis added)
Final and binding arbitration is a voluntary mechanism. To ascertain if
such agreement exists the court must ask: 1) was an agreement to arbitrate
made, and 2) has there been a breach of this agreement? These two determi-
nations require findings on the scope of both the agreement and the arbitration
clause.
In doing this the court "fully acknowledges" its inability to examine or
review the merits of the dispute. This would be contrary to the wishes of the
parties. The arbitrator has been asked to render a final and binding decision.
He has been given exclusive jurisdiction to interprete the collective agreement
but he has not been given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the scope of the
arbitration clause, otherwise he could completely ignore the parties' wishes
in determining his own jurisdiction.
This "logic" can carry the court into the construction and interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement in the name of ascertaining its scope
or the scope of any of its provisions. The degree of penetration depends on
the structure of the agreement.
An agreement may explicitly exclude or include a specific subject matter
in relation to the agreement or the arbitration clause. In this case the court
makes very little penetration into the merits and the arbitrator's function
remains intact. A second possibility is the definition of party rights with
reference to arbitral jurisdiction. This could be done by the vague definition
of management rights with an additional qualification that the exercise of
these vaguely defined rights are not to be subject to the arbitral process. The
court in ascertaiinng the scope of the arbitration clause must first ascertain
the content of the management rights provision excluded from the arbitral
scope. The court must penetrate to the very merits of the dispute in the inter-
pretation and elaboration of the management rights provision. This penetra-
09 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317 (1st Dept. 1947), aft'd, 297 N.Y. 519,
74 N.E. 2d 464 (1947); See also Technical Engineers, Local 149 v. General Electric,
250 F. 2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957); Davenport v.Procter and Gamble Manufacturing Co.,
241 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1957).
10067 N.Y.S. 2d 317, 318.
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tion results in a court construction of the agreement at the expense of and
without the expertise of the arbitrator, the person originally commissioned by
the parties to perform this task. A third possibility is the inclusion of a
standard arbitration clause requesting the adjudicator to interpret, construe
and apply the agreement with the possible qualification that he is not allowed
to add to or modify the negotiated terms of the contract. Here the court can
intervene at two points. One, it will ascertain the scope of the agreement to
determine whether it applies to the dispute in question. If the agreement
does not apply the arbitration clause cannot either. Should the agreement
apply [as it did in Cutler Hammer], the court must go on to consider if the
arbitration clause applies. One possible outcome is that of Cutler Hammer.
The court in its wisdom deems the provision in question "beyond dispute".
There is therefore nothing to arbitrate. A variation of this approach is a ruling
that the words "interpret and apply" give no jurisdiction to misinterpret. A
misinterpretation would modify the meaning of the agreement and disregard
an express limitation on the arbitrator's jurisdiction or power. The legerde-
main is completely apocalyptic of the arbitrator's function. The court, in
ascertaining the arbitrator's jurisdiction or whether the dispute is arbitrable,
passes upon and resolves the merits. The arbitrator is left unemployed and
the court has buttressed its position with the underlying assumption that the
wording of the collective agreement divorced from its context, can be attri-
buted a meaning "beyond dispute". The court's approach implies that arbi-
trability or jurisdiction is a concept that exists in the abstract from which
certain consequences flow on "discovering" its existence or absence. The
approach is spurious and completely devoid of the institutional inquiry that
asks who performs a particular task best. For these reasons the position was
severely criticized by commentators. Fortunately this input was instrumental
in providing intellectual guidance for the court. 01
The "logic" of this "pre-Trilogy" attitude, was not confined to the issue
of arbitrability. It was applied to the review of grievance arbitration awards.
Western Union Telegraph Company v. American Communications Associa-
tion10 2 held that a misinterpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
was in excess of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The arbitrator is given
jurisdiction to interpret, not to misinterpret. A misinterpretation is considered
a modification of the agreement and this is expressly prohibited. This reason-
ing is no less beguiling and subject to the preceding criticisms. To say that
errors of law and fact are not reviewable because the parties have voluntarily
submitted to such contingencies and then to apply the logic of Western Union
is to make a mockery of judicial reasoning, impuning the integrity of the
court that espouses such casuistry.
Io'Supra note 82, in addition to Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, supra
note 45; Cox, Current Problems in Grievance Arbitration, supra note 76. The two Cox
articles exhibit a remarkable similarity to the position, eventually adopted by the
Supreme Court.
102 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E. 2d 162 (1949).
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Trilogy et a03
The preceding section depicted the background and the pressures giving
rise to this trio of cases. Commonly referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy,
they created and elaborated the standards in this legal hiatus. Two conflicting
dictates inherent in any arbitration clause have been described. One being
that the clause should be enforced if it applies because the parties have opted
for an informed arbitrator to interpret their agreement when disputes arise.
The other being a derivative of the first, that the court must construe this
clause, and the agreement if need be, to insure that it indeed does apply. This
latter notion appears to covet the arbitrator's function at times and deprive
the parties of their wish for an "informed" decision. A third factor turned the
scales in this apparent dilemma and inspired in the court a new direction.
This third factor, sec. 203 (d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
1947104 was adopted by the court as a reflection of legislative policy in this
area. This provision was thought to embody Congress' confidence in the
grievance arbitration machinery as facilitative of "industrial peace". The
section simply reads:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. 105
United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company'°6
revolved around the eligibility of a disabled employee to return to work. The
specific issue was one of arbitrability or more specifically did the arbitration
clause apply? The employee had settled with workmen's compensation on the
basis of a 25 per cent partial, yet permanent disability. He then applied to
return to work under the seniority provision of the collective bargaining
agreement. The company refused, maintaining that the claim was a frivolous
and patently baseless one. The union brought an action under s. 301 for
enforcement of the promise to arbitrate and the District Court refused, holding
that the employee was estopped from returning by accepting the compensation.
The Court of Appeal agreed in result but differed in its reasoning. It agreed
with the company that the claim was frivolous. Either the collective agreement
did not apply or it did apply but the meaning was so clear that the issue was
"beyond dispute". Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court,
reversed the lower holdings. He stated that the "beyond dispute" doctrine of
Cutler Hammer could only have a crippling effect on grievance arbitration, a
process commended to the parties by Congress. 07 This position appears to
be founded on the notion that what is obvious to the court may well be
103 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company (1960),
63 U.S. 564; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Com-
pany (1960), 363 U.S. 574; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and
Car Corporation (1960), 363 U.S. 593; Atkinson et al. v. Sinclair Refining Company
(1962), 370 U.S. 238; Drake Bakeries Incorporated v. Local 50, American Bakery
and Confectionary Workers International (1962), 370 U.S. 254; John Wiley and Sons
Incorporated v. Livingston President of District 65, Retail Wholesale and Department
Store Union, (1964), 376 U.S. 543.
104 61 Stat 154, 29 U.S.C. 173(d), 29 U.S. C.A., 173(d).
105 Id.
100 (1960), 363 U.S. 564.
107 Id. 567-8.
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inconsistent with the intended meaning of the agreement. This position em-
bodies the value of arbitral expertise. In addition he took the position that
all disputes concerning the agreement not just the meritorious ones were to
go through the grievance arbitration process. Mr. Justice Douglas, in formu-
lating a standard of review stated:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit
all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascer-
taining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its
face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is
a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances
the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, and all that
it connotes that was bargained for.'08
(emphasis added)
Attempting to clarify "on its face" emphasis was added to the fact that the
court had no business weighing the merits or determining whether there was
particular language in the written instrument to support the claim.' 09 Mr.
Justice Brennan elaborated Mr. Justice Douglas' position in relation to the
specific wording that a reviewing court may encounter. He noted that the
arbitration clause could be narrow or wide in scope depending on the parties'
inclination. Whatever its form, it is to be construed in the light of the milieu
in which the clauses are negotiated and with reference to national labour
policy."0 If the clause states "any dispute" is to be submitted to the process
then the court's function is exhausted on this finding. If the issue of arbitra-
bility is explicitly granted to the arbitrator then the courts' function is again
exhausted on this finding. If the standard arbitration clause, relating to
disputes involving the interpretation and application of the agreement, is
present, the court is to interpret its meaning not the arbitrator. The meaning
of this clause is simply that the parties have agreed to arbitrate any dispute
which the moving party asserts to involve construction of the substantive
provision of the contract." By adopting this position the court has sought to
minimize its involvement in the merits of a grievance. The parties have
provided for arbitration and more importantly the court has reacted
accordingly.
Before summarizing the courts' position it is necessary to canvass the
sister case, United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation.
112
Mr. Justice Brennan's judgment applies to all three Trilogy cases and hence
makes them very interdependent. Also this case adds substantially to the
court's position and illustrates the implication of the American reasoning.
The case involved the subcontracting out of maintenance work resulting
in the lay-off of certain employees in the bargaining unit. The supervisors
thereafter laid out the work for the "subcontractor" and some of the laid-off
workers were hired in this capacity at reduced wages. A clause existed in the
collective agreement stating:
"matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be subject to
arbitration under this section".
108 Id. 567-8.
'
0 9 Id. 568.
110 Id. 570.
" Id. 571.
12 (1960), 363 U.S. 574.
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This is a classic illustration of the employer defining vague rights in terms of
arbitral jurisdiction. The arbitration clause was otherwise of the 'standard'
variety. The District Court granted the company's refusal to arbitrate on the
grounds that the subcontracting out of work was a function of management
and management functions were excluded from the arbitration process. 1 3
The Court of Appeal affirmed for these same reasons." 4
Mr. Justice Douglas once again delivering the opinion of the court,
reversed the Appeal Court. This judgment emphasized the reviewing court's
function in the light of the national labour policy and the skeletal nature of
the collective agreement.
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may
be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favour of coverage."15
(emphasis added)
We think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from
arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague
and the arbitration clause quite broad. Since any attempt by a court to infer such
a purpose necessarily comprehends the merits, the court should view with suspi-
cion any attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the
substantive provisions of a labour agreement even through the back door of
interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the sources
of an arbitrator."16
The court has applied the conceptual framework recommended above.
The court admits that its function is to ascertain whether the reluctant party
agreed to arbitrate the grievance, but it also recognizes the limitations of its
own institutional nature to achieve this end.
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of
the contract, as the industrial common law - the practices of the industry and
the shop - is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not
expressed in it. The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in
his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in
the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment
of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar
as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon
productivity of a particular result, its consequences to the morale of the shop,
his judgment whether tension will be heightened or diminished. For the parties'
objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common
goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement
serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cannot be similarly informed.117
The court is not going to increase the costs of judicial intervention
into the merits of a dispute when the parties or one party has vaguely defined
a substantive right in terms of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. The court does not
say it will never enter into such an interpretation; rather it imposes an obli-
gation on the parties to be specific and clear. This specificity and clarity will
minimize the costs of judicial intervention by diminishing the need for exper-
tise and the possibility of error. In summary, the court has concluded that the
113 168 F. Supp. 702.
"14 269 F.2d 633.
11 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
110 Id. 585.
17 Id. 581-82.
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costs of some forms of judicial interpretation, in the course of ascertaining
whether a party has breached its promise to arbitrate, are too great. These
costs were a product of the institutional differences between grievance arbi-
tration and the courts. To insure that these costs are not in excess of the gains
of intervention, while maintaining its role as the enforcer of voluntary
agreements, the court erected a presumption in favour of arbitration that can
only be rebuted with an explicit provision. An explicit provision "which
brings the grievance under the cover of the exclusion clause.""18 Further-
more, the court refused to look at the bargaining history as evidence of an
intention to exclude this subject matter from arbitration which clearly re-
flects its concern with institutional limitations. If express contract language
requires the expertise of arbitral interpretation to ascertain its real meaning,
the bargaining history cannot be anymore lucid."19
Before proceeding to United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel and Car Corporation120 note that the court has in effect redefined the
nature of the collective agreement. By referring to 'gap filling' in the light of
past practice' 2' and the elaborative role of the arbitrator; 2 2 while not defining
anything inconsistent with the adjudicative model and the theory of legal
reasoning outlined above, the court has broadened the concept of the labour
agreement. This expanded notion with its underlying rationale based upon
industrial reality and institutional values is important in understanding the
Enterprise case.
While decided on the same day as the preceding two, in this case the
courts' attention was directed to the role of the court in reviewing an arbitra-
tion award. For one reason or another, the court appears to have abandoned
the analytic framework of American and Warrior, reverting to contradictory,
abstract statements. Lower courts have grasped these statements when looking
for some apparent rationale for intervention.
A group of employees left their job in protest of the discharge of a fellow
employee. On returning to work they found their jobs unavailable and a
grievance was filed to which the company refused to arbitrate. The District
Court ordered arbitration and the arbitrator found the discharges unjust,
although some discipline was appropriate. He instituted a ten-day suspension
and otherwise ordered reinstatement with back pay. After the discharge, but
before the award, the collective agreement expired and the company refused
to comply. The District Court directed compliance 123 and the Court of Appeal
reversed it emphasizing the expiration of the agreement and with it any reme-
dial power of the arbitrator.
The Supreme Court reversed the Appeal Court without articulating a
standard for reviewing courts when dealing with arbitration awards. The
following reasons were important in upholding the award.
118 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co. (1960), 363
U.S. 564, 572.
119 Id.
120 (1960), 363 U.S. 593.





123 168 F. Supp. 308.
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The arbitrator is to utilize his 'informed judgment' when formulating
remedies. The court stated:
There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The drafts-
men may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to
meet a particular contingency.
24
The court rejected any suggestion of review on the basis "that if the
'correct' principles of law had been applied to the interpretation of the agree-
ment it could be determined that the collective agreement did not so pro-
vide" x. 25 This would amount to an appeal on the merits which is contrary to
the final and binding character of the arbitration clause. The question is x4ot
whether the arbitrator was "right" or "wrong" on the merits; but rather at
this stage of review, did he have authority power, or jurisdiction to do what
he did? This is a different question than that involved in arbitrability;126 yet
intuitively one feels that the same analysis should apply. In Enterprise, the
court felt the award was ambiguous on the issue of the existence of power
or jurisdiction. It was not clear exactly what source the arbitrator had relied
upon for his power to do what he did. In light of the great need for flexibility
in remedial situations, the court held that mere ambiguity as to the source of
power is not reason for refusing to enforce the award.12 7 Mr. Justice Douglas
did not explain this ruling in terms of the court's difficulty in ascertaining
whether the authority does or does not exist. In fact his underlying assumption
is that power, authority or jurisdiction can easily and objectively be as-
certained. Yet the same problems exist here as exist in relation to the concept
of arbitrability. There the court responded with 'presumptions' and the stand-
ards of 'positive assurance' and 'explicitly excluded'.
The most innocuous statement in Enterprise that appears to cut back
everything, reads:
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and application of the
collective agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award
is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation,
courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.'
2 8
This paragraph could be very confining and justify an extreme encroach-
ment on the merits by reviewing courts if divorced from everything that has
been said in relation to both the issues of arbitrability and authority canvassed
by the three cases collectively. This wording appears to encourage the court to
determine the scope and content of the agreement in order to ascertain
whether the award draws its essence from it. However a just as literal inter-
pretation would leave the court powerless if the last sentence is construed to
allow intervention only when the rhetoric of the award manifests an infidelity
to this obligation. 120 The better view is that it prohibits the exercise of a
policy-making model of grievance arbitration considered above. Mr. Justice
124 (1960), 363 U.S. 593, 597.
125 Id. 598.
120 The court specifically rejects that it (arbitrability) is involved in this case.
127 Enterprise op. cit. 598.
128 Id. 597.
120 Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining (1961),
28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 464, 484-5.
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Douglas may have thought that some restrictive language was necessary to
set parameters for his optimistic and extremely broad characterization of
arbitral functioning in American and Warrior. Furthermore the phrase 'draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement' embraces the newly
defined nature of the collective agreement depicted in the American and
Warrior cases. It subsumes notions about the skeletal, yet purposive nature
of contract provisions, the elaborative role of the arbitrator, and the 'common
law' of the shop as evidenced by the past practice of the parties and their
bargaining history. The American and Warrior holdings have not been cut
back if this view is taken of the Enterprise case and the conceptual frame-
work while not applied in Enterprise could legitimately be used in subsequent
cases to develop a standard for the review of arbitration awards.
Two subsequent cases, closely following the Trilogy, did not add to the
substantive doctrine articulated by the court in American and Warrior. Atkin-
son et al. v. Sinclair Refining Co.130 and Drake Bakeries Incorporated v.
Local 50, American Bakery and Confectionary Workers Internationall
3'
were requests for arbitration involving a union's breach of the no-strike
provision of a collective agreement. In Atkinson the court held that the
subject matter was explicitly excluded from arbitration and in Drake Bakeries
the court held that it was not specifically excluded and therefore arbitrable.
The final significant Supreme Court case in this area, 32 John Wiley and
Sons Inc. v. Livingston, President of District 65, Retail Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union,33 involved the doctrine of arbitrability and it substan-
tially elaborates the holdings of American and Warrior. The union had nego-
tiated a collective bargaining agreement which did not contain an express
provision indicating whether the contract was binding or not on successor
corporation. The company did in fact merge with another, although the origi-
nal company's physical plant continued operations. The successor was not
unionized and the union under the collective agreement of the merged cor-
poration asserted a continuation of the benefits. The successor denied that
this was so, as well as pointing to procedural limitations that had arisen
under the contract in question. The Supreme Court attacked the problem in
a very confusing way. Instead of dealing with the continuation of the con-
tract per se or the fact that the application of the agreement was ambiguous
180 (1962), 370 U.S. 238.
'3' (1962), 370 U.S. 254.
'82This is not to say cases such as Carey v. Westinghouse (1964), 375 U.S. 261,
84 S.Ct. 401 are not significant. Carey in particular reflects the judicial confidence in
the arbitration process. But in this case I believe it is mistaken. However the error has
been substantially corrected by lower court procedural holdings. The court in Carey
deferred to arbitration on the apparent issue of work assignment disputes that had in
fact jurisdictional questions at the root of the matter. Quite obviously at any adjudica-
tion only one party affected would be represented and presenting proofs and reasoned
argument. This is wholly in conflict with the adjudicatory process described in part one
and is hardly satisfactory from an industrial relations point of view. However recent
lower court decisions such as C.B.S. v. Broadcasting Association, 72 L.R.R.M. 2140
(2d Cir. 1969), aff'g 69 L.R.R.M. 2914 have allowed motions to compel joint arbi-
tration in an effort to maintain the integrity of the process. The reason these cases
are not dealt with in this paper is due to the fact that they do not pertain or add to the
cases in the area this paper is specifically concerned with.
133 (1964), 376 U.S. 543.
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in these circumstances and therefore on the basis of American and Warrior,
arbitrable; the Court held that in circumstances such as these, the company
is required to arbitrate with the union under the collective agreement. 134 this
position was arrived at by 1) expanding the implications of the nature of the
collective agreement, 2) noting that there was no express provision to the
contrary and 3) by having regard to the national labour policy.
The logical question is: how is the arbitrator going to proceed if the
contract is silent? The answer is both implicit and explicit. Implicitly the court
draws again on the adage that what is clear to a court may be inconsistent
with the intention of the parties. The institutional structure of arbitration,
embracing a knowledgeable adjudicator, is best suited for this determination
and the arbitrator may refuse the union's request on the issue of arbitrality.
Whether or not the union demands have merit will be determined by the arbitrator
in light of the fully developed facts. It is sufficient for present purposes that the
demands are not so plainly unreasonable that the subject matter of the dispute
must be regarded as non arbitrable because it can be seen in advance that no
award to the union could receive judicial sanction. 35
This passage does not clearly articulate the distinction between 'threshold
arbitrability' and 'in fact' arbitrability but it is only logical that the distinction
exists.' 86 If the court is going to use presumption because arbitration is best
suited to deal with ill-defined issues, the arbitrator must be able to refuse to
decide when he finds that the agreement does not apply.' 87 Such a holding
would be a distinct possibility in the Wiley fact situation.
The court devised specific standards and applied the conceptual frame-
work outlined above on the issue of procedural arbitrability.
We think that labor disputes of the kind involved here cannot be broken down
so easily into their 'substantive' and 'procedural' aspects. Questions concerning
the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum, they develop
in the context of an actual dispute about the rights of the parties to the contract
or those covered by it18
184 Id. 548.
For an illustration of circumstances when this is not so see McGarie v. Humble
Oil Refining Co., 355 F. 2d 352, 61 L.R.R.M. 2410 (2d Circ. 1966) cert. denied 384
U.S. 988 62 L.R.R.M. 2339 (1966); Printing Pressmen v. Pride Papers Corp., 75
L.R.R.M. 2185 (D.C.N.Y. 1970) and for a reaction of the parties in the drafting of
agreements see, San Diego District Council of Carpenters v. Wood, Wire and Metal
Lathers International Union, 60 L.C. 52, 123 (4d Circ. 1969). San Diego District
Council of Carpenters v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International Union, (4d Cir.
1969) 60 L.C. 52, 123.
185 Id. 555.
13s See B.N.A., L.R.X., s. 19 Piano Workers v. Kimball Co., (D.C. No. 111 1965)
58 L.R.R.M. 2752 rejected the distinction and held that the labour arbitrator could not
redecide the issue of arbitrability.
As to the related issue, Ficek v. Southern Pacific Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2573 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied 60 L.R.R.M. 2284 (Sup. Ct. 1965) held that a company had waived its
right to raise the issue of arbitrability by submitting to arbitration. However Humble
Oil and Refining Co. v. Teamsers Local 866, 65 L.R.R.M. 3016 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) has
indicated disagreement. See also B.N.A. L.R.X., s.18d.
187See Federal Labor Union v. Midvale Heppenstal Co., 73 L.R.R.M. 2384 (3rd
Cir. 1970) aff'g 71 LR.R.M. 2876, where the court upholds the arbitrator's decision
that the issue had not been provided for in the collective agreement.
188 376 U.S. 543, 556-7.
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Consequently the issue of procedural arbitrability is for the sole deter-
mination of the arbitrator. This guide for reviewing courts was arrived at by
a benefit-cost analysis of judicial intervention in the light of the institutional
differences between the courts and arbitration systems.139 The court feels
that the costs of intervention are in excess of those costs generated in the
'substantive arbitrability' issues and therefore a mere presumption will not
suffice. Therefore the result is a total withdrawal of judicial intervention. 40
The preceding cases have been subjected to extensive criticism with
unusual focus on the rhetoric of the decisions and a marked neglect at devising
some kind of conceptual rationale on which to justify the holdings and apply
to future cases.' 41 A conceptual rationale does exist. The court has erected
presumptions or totally withdrawn on the basis of institutional values. It has
not sanctioned a free working policy-making model of arbitration at the same
time. Here is where much criticism has been misdirected. Everything the court
has said and done is completely consistent with the adjudicative model of
grievance arbitration developed above. This cannot be said for the other
models. In addition, the area where the court has freely intervened and in
my opinion should continue to do s6, is in those decisions dealing with the
preservation of the integrity of the adjudicative model involving fair represen-
tation, bias, fraud, and improper exclusion of relevant evidence. In applying
the calculus used in American and Warrior to these cases, the court has
decided that the costs of intervention do not outweigh the gains. It is in these
139 This deference or total absention is respected even on the review of an arbitra-
tion award. This suggests that the standards fashioned for arbitrality may indeed be
applicable and workable on judicial review of the award. See James B. Chambers v.
Beaunit Corp., 59 L.C. 13,071, 69 L.R.R.M. 2732 (6th Cir. 1968).
140 This standard has been closely followed by lower courts. See, Curtis Produc-
tions Inc. v. Writers Guild, 76 L.R.R.M. 2174 (A.D.N.Y. 1970); Tobacco Workers v.
P. Lorillard Corp., 75 L.R.R.M. 2437 (D.C.N.C. 1970).
141 For academic comment directed specifically to the Trilogy see, Aaron, "Arbi-
tration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy," in Collective Bargaining and
the Arbitrator's Role (1962); Hays, The Supreme Court, and Labor Law, October
Term, 1959 (1960), 60 Col. L. Rev. 901; Mayer, Labor Relations 1961: The Steel-
workers Cases Re-Examined (1962), 13 Lab. L. J. 213; Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining (1961), 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 464; Wallen,
Recent Court Decisions on Arbitration: An Arbitrator's View (1961), 63 W. Va. L. Rev.
295.
More recent post-Trilogy appraisals are: Christianson, Labor Arbitration and
Judicial Oversight (1967-68), 19 Stan. L. Rev. 671; Dunau, Three Problems in Labor
Arbitration (1969), 55 Va. L. Rev. 427; Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process
(1965); Griffin, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards (1969), 4 Suffolk U. L
Rev. 39; Hays, Labor Arbitration: A Dissenting View (1966); Seitz, Book Review
(1967), 19 Stanford L Rev. 698; Wallen, Book Review (1968), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 507;
Jones and Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Labor Arbitra-
tion Process: A Report With Comments (1964), Mich. L. Rev. 1115; Jones and Smith,
The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges, Arbi-
trators and Parties (1966), 52 Va. L. Rev. 831; Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology,
Law and Labor Arbitration (1967), 34 U. Chli. L. Rev. 545; Mayers, Bargaining Pro-
blems, Techniques, (1967) B.N.A. Labor Rel. Yrbok. 56; Note, Judicial Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards After The Trilogy (1967-68), 53 Cornell L. Rev. 136;
Prasow, and Peters, Arbitration and Collective Bargaining (1970); Smith, The Question
of 'Arbitrability' The Roles of Arbitrator, the Court and the Parties (1962), 16 S.W.LJ.
1; Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process (1968) c. 3; Wellington, Freedom of Con-
tract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (1963-64), 112 U. Pa. L Rev. 467.
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areas where the industrial relations expertise so facilitative in the interpreta-
tion of the collective agreements is not essential. In fact the court has
developed its own expertise and feeling in the "adjudicative process" area
through the years.
Post-Trilogy Inquiry
The preceding section illustrated the United States Supreme Court's per-
ception of the grievance arbitration process. This perception manifested itself
in the form of a set of concrete standards to be applied in judicial considera-
tion of arbitrability. With regard to arbitration awards the industrial relations
considerations were reflected in the opinion of Enterprise; yet concrete stand-
ards were not developed. The effectiveness of the court's approach can be
measured by the reaction of the industrial participants and the response of
lower courts in the application of the articulated doctrines. From all reports
available, private reaction has generally been neutral or non-existent in rela-
tion to the Trilogy.1 42 The cases did not spawn a proliferation of explicit
restrictive clauses to rebut the presumptions created by the court.1 43 Nor has
there been an outcry from the parties complaining of unremedied arbitrational
misfeasance. 44 However academic circles have not been so tranquil. 45
This placid private response may be interpreted as a vindication of the
Supreme Court's policy. Indeed, it could be interpreted as an indication of
a completely harmonious relationship between the arbitrators and the parties.
But another possible construction is that reviewing courts have not honoured
the Trilogy dictates concerning arbitrability. The courts may look closely at
arbitral reasoning, vacating unconvincing efforts in reviewing arbitration
awards. A judicial response such as this would make private reaction super-
fluous. An examination of the judicial response is therefore needed.
The Issue of Arbitrability: Trilogy Aftermath
In applying the calculus outlined above the court developed concrete
standards for review. These rules, a product of the American,4 6 Warrior
i47
and John Wiley' 48 cases might be stated in the following fashion.
142 Jones and Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the
Labor Arbitration Process: A Report With Comments, supra note 141.
143 Jones and Smith, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance
Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators and the Parties, supra note 141, 841. Of course
there are exceptions to this assertion and it is not surprising to note that the General
Electric Corporation is a classic illustration. For a reproduction of the restrictive arbi-
tration provisions in its collective agreement, that takes one full page of a law report,
and a commensurate amount of judicial effort: See Electrical Workers (I.U.E.) v.
General Electric Corp., 59 L.C. 13, 174 (2nd Cir. 1968); see also Myers, supra note
185, 56-57; Siegal, Labor Law Reports to the A.B.A., 56 L.R.R.M. 26 (1964).
144 Id. See also Christianson, supra note 141, 695.
1
45 Supra note 141.
146 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
147 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
148 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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1) If there exists the standard arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement with no explicit exclusion directed at the dispute in question
and the moving party asserts that the collective bargaining agreement
has been violated, the presumption in favour of arbitration is operative
and predominant. The courts are to direct the dispute to arbitration.
2) If there is an exclusionary clause directed at the particular subject matter
in dispute but its meaning with reference to exclusion or inclusion is
vague or in doubt the presumption is again operative and predominant.
In addition, the presumption includes a prohibition against examining
the bargaining history of the parties to ascertain the meaning of an
opaque exclusionary provision.
3) If there exists a specific exclusionary provision undoubtedly applying
to the particular dispute then the reviewing court must enforce it even
though the merits of the dispute are involved. In this case the pre-
sumption must give way to the clear and unambiguous intent of the
parties to exclude this issue from the arbitration process.
4) If the issue involves not the substantive question of arbitrability but
rather the procedural aspect of it, this issue is exclusively for the arbi-
trator and the courts are to absolutely defer to that process.
The general impression conveyed by lower court rulings is one of
enlightened acceptance. Acceptance in the sense that reviewing courts have
generally distilled and applied these standards in a way consistent with the
Trilogy philosophy.
This is not to say that there has been an absolute compliance, or that
reviewing courts have been without difficulty in seeing the meaning of
"'a claim which on its face is governed by the contract."'1 49 For example in
Independent Oil Workers Union Local 117 v. American Oil Company'50 the
Kansas District Court held that it was not sufficient to simply alledge a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Rather there must exist
some term which supports such a claim.
A similar confusion or disregard is apparent in Beckley Manufacturing
Corporation v. Local Union 2011 of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers.'5' The union complained that the incentive system did
not yield what the agreement provided for. The court patently construed
and interpreted the agreement holding that the provision in the agreement
did not provide for a guaranteed yield. Should this question go to arbitration
and the arbitrator hold in favour of the union he would be modifying the
terms of the collective agreement which is expressly prohibited. Therefore
the dispute is not arbitrable. Clearly such reasoning is spurious and blatantly
insensitive to the directives of the Supreme Court.
A somewhat more subtle but equally erroneous decision is Halstead
and Mitchell Company v. the Steelworkers.52 The company reduced its work
149 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564,
567-8. However note Mr. Justice Brennan's interpretation at 571.
150 59 L.C. 13, 388 (D.C. Kan. 1969).
15159 L.C. 13, 366 (D.C. W. Va. 1969).
152 72 L.R.R.M. 2915 (3rd Cir. 1969).
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force in two departments because it eliminated a third shift for a period of
fifteen days. During the fifteen days, many employees, because of rotating
shift system, lost five days of work. The reduction in the work force was
made without regard to the seniority of the employees affected. The collective
agreement contained a 'management rights' clause which claimed to retain
all that was not expressly abridged by a specific provision. In addition this
clause enumerated certain exclusive management rights including the sole
determination of the existence of facts which are the basis of a management
decision, absolute control over the volume of production and the authority
to lay off, terminate or otherwise relieve employees from duty for lack of
work or other legitimate reasons. A seniority clause obligated the company
to consider employee seniority in a work reduction and a layoff, with the
exception:
... if for any reason there is work fluctuation or equipment downtime within a
section or departmental unit necessitating a reduction in the work force for a
short period of time not to exceed fifteen work days, the Company shall have
the right to layoff or make work assignments as are experienced without regard
to seniority.
Clearly this is arbitrable. The union claims that seniority is applicable
and that the exception is not operative. They claim that the work reduction
was due to excessive inventories and not a work fluctuation or equipment
downtime which are the condition precedents to the exception. The company
relied on the management's rights clause which gave it sole authority over
the determination of the basis or cause of a lay off; thereby bringing the
fact situation within the seniority exception. In any event there is a dispute
about the meaning and application of the agreement and it is not even one in
which party rights have been defined in terms of arbitral power or authority.
Therefore the presumption in favour of arbitration should be applied as it
should have in Beckley Manufacturing and American Oil. However the
Court of Appeal using similar ledgerdemain held that the managements
rights clause applied in relation to its (the court's) interpretation of the
seniority clause exception. This being the case the seniority exception applies,
the work reduction was for less than fifteen days, therefore the company does
not have to go to arbitration. Of course not, the court has just performed
that function.
Fortunately the preceding are exceptions to a general acceptance of the
Trilogy.5" Generally the courts have applied American and Warrior accu-
rately even in those difficult cases where restrictive language exists in the
form of substantive rights. In International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. General Electric Company54 particular operations
were ceased and employees laid off. The arbitration clause excluded issues
involving the company's right to 'shut-down'. However the union claimed
that one weeks notice must be given under the terms of the collective agree-
ment before a change in work hours could occur. The company initially
Irs For a case similar to Halstead which reflects the general judicial response: see
Local 198, Rubber Workers v. Interco Incorporated, 72 L.R.R.M. 2377 (8th Cir. 1969).
Aff'g 68 L.R.R.M. 3081.
154 59 L.C. 13,241 (2nd. Cir. 1969).
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contended that the layoff was temporary and therefore no notice was required.
At trial it relied solely on the "shutdown" exclusion contained in the arbitra-
tion clause. The appeal court was of the opinion that the impact of the
exclusionary wording was obscure or in the court's own words, "a calculated
ambiguity". The court queried what "shutdown" meant and if this was a
"shutdown", what impact would it have on the other provisions of the
collective agreement. It could not be said with "positive assurance" that the
arbitration clause was unsusceptible to the union's contention, therefore
arbitration was ordered. The holding is very much in accord with the
Trilogy. Many other cases could be related to convey this same point.",,
The John Wiley holding has been even more successful. Very little deviation
is possible to detect.0 6 However the fact that it is an absolute prohibition
may explain the unanimity in response.
An area in the arbitrability decisions where judicial deference to arbi-
tration has not taken place, involve those cases dealing with "adjudicative
process" issues. These issues relate to the preservation of the institutional
characteristics of an adjudicative process and include cases considering the
absence of such features as fair representation, a fair hearing and even the
existence of arbitral expertise. If one of the constituent elements of the adjudi-
cative process is absent or will be absent, deference to arbitration is not
granted. This area is not an exception to the application of the "calculus of
intervention" but really an application of it. The court is expert in the
determination of the existence of essential adjudicative elements and precious
little industrial relations experience is required. Even though this intervention
imposes expenditures of time and money, inconsistent with certain funda-
mental values of arbitration the costs of intervention do not outweigh the
gains. The integrity of the entire process is being protected. In Ruth C.
Chapman v. Southeast Region LL.G.W.U. Health and Welfare Recreation
Fund'57 the company had paid money representing vacation pay under a
collective agreement, to a fund administered by the union. The union then
paid the monies to the employees and deducted a certain administrative fee
from the amount due to non-union workers. These non-union people brought
an action under section 301 claiming the total vacation pay owed in accord-
ance with the collective bargaining agreement and the South Carolina right
to work laws. The union requested a stay or proceedings pending arbitration.
The court cited Vaca v. Sipes:58 as illustrative of a judicial deference to arbi-
1551LU.O.E. Local 103 v. Crown Construction Co., 70 L.R.R.M. 184; Communica-
tions Workers of America v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 60 LC. 10,233 (5th
Cir. 1969); Electrical Workers, LU.E. v. General Electric Co., 59 L.C. 13,174 (2nd
Cir. 1968). The General Electric case illustrates the high standard of clarity to which
the draftsman of a restrictive clause is held.
156 Curtis Productions Inc. v. Writers Guild, 76 L.R.R.M. 2174 (A.D.N.Y. 1970);
Tobacco Workers v. P. Loullard Corp., 75 L.R.R.M. 2437 (D.C.N.C. 1970); Local
616 (I.U.E.) v. Byrd Plastic Inc., 74 LR.R.M. 2550 (3rd Cir. 1970).
157280 F. Supp. 766 (1968). For a similar stance by the National Labour Rela-
tions Board see Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); Honolulu Star Bulletin,
128 N.L.R.B. 395 (1959).
158 (1967), 386 U.S. 171.
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tration but noted that the attitude was not an inflexible one.159 This deference
gives way when it is apparent that the adjudicatory process will not function
properly. This will be the case if the two parties presenting reasoned argu-
ment and proofs are neither adverse in interest nor the parties affected by the
decision.
The real claim herein is accordingly against the union itself for what the plaintiffs
charge was an unlawful deduction made for the advantage of the union or its
affiliate. If wrong has been done the plaintiff's, the active wrongdoer is the Union,
aided by the employer. 10o
In addition, the dispute required an interpretation of legislation in the
form of right to work laws; a task for which the arbitrator is personally and
institutionally ill-suited to perform.1 61 These two features resulted in a denial
of the motion to stay the proceedings.
6 2
The Supreme Court's directives have been adequate and effective.
Subsequent courts have had little difficulty in extracting and applying the
standards.' 3 Has the same response occurred in the review of arbitration
awards?
Review of Arbitration Awards: Trilogy Aftermath
The development and clarity of the Trilogy reasoning is unsatisfactory
in this area. The Supreme Court could be faulted for not concretizing its
rationale of restraint in the form of explicit standards; yet reviewing courts
have unnecessarily dwelled on the rhetoric of the Enterprise decision.
A few points should be restated before examining a number of cases.
First, it is not open for the courts to review the merits of the dispute. This
would represent an appeal and the parties have provided for final and binding
arbitration. The court has no power to correct errors the arbitrator may
make, be they errors of law, fact or mixed fact and law. The parties have
manifested a desire for the arbitrator's opinion and his alone. Secondly, the
159 This was noted by the Court in Republic Steel Company v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650, 654 as did the Court in Vaca at 185. Mr. Justice White in Vaca stated:
because these contractual remedies have been devised and are often controlled
by the union and the employer, they may well prove unsatisfactory or unworkable
for the individual grievant. The problem then is to determine under what cir-
cumstances the individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach of
contract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial
procedures.
160 280 F. Supp. 766, 769; See also Watson v. Dudahy Co., 75 L.R.R.M. 2632
(D.C. Col. 1970).
161 See Associated Milk Dealers Inc. v. Milk Drivers, 73 LR.R.M. 2435 (7th Cir.
1970) for a similar judicial consideration of institutional structure.
102 Luchenback Overseas Corporation v. Curron, 68 L.R.R.M. 3040, 3042 (2nd
Cir. 1968) (dictem); Local 234, 1 L.G.W.U. v. Beauty Belt Lingerie, 48 L.R.R.M. 2995,
2997 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) are qualifications to this position.103 An area where there has been confusion and which I really have not dealt with
is in the legitimacy of the use of bargaining history to ascertain particular restrictive
meaning in the issue of arbitrability. Mr. Justice Brennan's judment dealing with Warrior
indicated that the court should not intervene because of the expertise required to distill
the meaning of such conflicting data. See American, 363 U.S. 564, 572. However, see
Independent Soap Workers of Sacramento v. Proctor and Gamble Mfg. Co., 314 F. 2d
38 (9th Cir. 1962).
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arbitrator's power comes exclusively from the agreement and is limited by it.
The parties can therefore put restrictions on the arbitrator and if these
restrictions are contravened a reviewing court can vacate the award due to
an excess of jurisdiction or lack of authority. The parties can also preclude
certain subjects from coverage under the collective agreement. These subjects
so precluded are therefore not arbitrable. The Supreme Court has requested
that this exclusion be done with some degree of clarity otherwise a dispute
involving such a subject will go to arbitration. This position reflects the courts
deference to arbitration and an understanding of its own institutional
limitations.
The jurisdiction or power of the arbitrator should be treated in the
same way. This has not been the case due to the court's failure to create
standards of review in the Enterprise opinion. Lower courts have pursued
an abstract concept of jurisdiction with no thought of the costs that this
pursuit imposes on grievance arbitration. In fact, the courts regularly mis-
apply the concept and entertain a full appeal on the merits compounding
the costs of intervention. The fact that the court agrees or disagrees with the
arbitrator's opinion should be irrelevant. The costs of delay, money, formal-
ism and the incentive to appeal are incurred no matter how the court comes
out on the issue. Professor Christianson says that of 125 cases he reviewed
only 10% were vacated.1 4 The 10% are significant; but the entire one
hundred twenty-five cases suffer from a distorted concept of review.1 "
The cases break down into two general types. First are those cases in
which substantive rights are defined in terms of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
The arbitrator appears to contravene the restriction in interpreting a party's
rights. The court then has to construe the provision in order to determine
whether the arbitrator has in fact exceeded or contravened his jurisdictional
restraints and at the same time necessarily determines the party's rights. The
other group of cases do not involve an explicit restraint on the arbitrator's
jurisdiction. The arbitrator simply misinterprets the collective agreement or
in the technical jargon commits an error of law, fact or mixed-law and fact.
Such an error should be ureviewable but this is not the case in fact. In choos-
ing between the two literal interpretations of the rhetoric in Enterprise, the
courts have accepted an interpretation favouring a review of the merits. The
phrase "..., yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement" has been used to sanction an
extensive review of arbitral reasoning. If the award is "clearly erroneous" or
"arbitrary and capricious" it is said to invite review.' 60 An examination of
the two types of cases elucidates this criticism.
Magnavox Company v. International Union of Electrical Workers07 is
illustrative of the first group of cases. Management's rights were defined in
164 Christianson, supra note 141, 682.
165 This is not to say that all of the cases incur unnecessary costs and that all
of the reasoning employed is erroneous. The cases have to be approached on the basis
of the classification used for the arbitrability cases. In particular areas the court
should always intervene despite the costs. However the rationale must be articulated
and the gains emphasized.
166 International Association of Machinists Local 2003 v. Hayes Corporation,
296 F.2d 238, 242 (1961).
167 410 F.2d 388, 60 L.C. 10,156 (6th Cir. 1969), aff'g 68 LR.R.M. 2846.
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terms of arbitral power. This situation is quite common in the employee
discipline area. An employee who had just returned to work after some
heart trouble was ordered to do work and refused on the grounds of his
health. He was discharged for insubordination. A clause existed in the
collective agreement that restricted the arbitrator from relieving in this
situation except where the employee could positively establish a health hazard.
The employee could not do this and yet the arbitrator granted relief from the
discharge. He did so in contravention of the explicit limitation on his authority.
The reviewing court vacated the award.
The following cases differ from those where the arbitrator has just
misinterpreted a particular provision. The difference lies in the existence of
some express yet ambiguous provision which appears to restrict the arbitrator.
Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1386 v. American Thread Com-
pany 68 is such a case. An employee allowed a cotton lap to run through a
carding machine causing damage. He was discharged. Management had
reserved the right to discipline for just cause and just cause was elaborated
in the following terms,
JUST CAUSE: Employees shall be disciplined or discharged only for just cause,
which shall include, but not be limited to, insubordination; violation of valid plant
rules; failure to obey instructions or supervisors; failure of an employee to
properly perform his job in accordance with Company standards ... 169
(emphasis added)
The arbitrator accepted that the conduct took place but did not believe it
called for discharge. He did not feel the 'just cause' provision precluded such
a position stating that he was:
'not foreclosed from inquiry in this case, whether just cause for discharge, rather
for a lesser discipline measure existed.'170
A close reading of the provision suggests such an interpretation is
possible; otherwise any violation would be grounds for discharge or discipline
with no distinction being made between the two penalties. The Court of
Appeal vacated the award. The court felt it was implicit that the arbitrator
had found just cause existed (he did not, for he stated only that the conduct
took place). Consequently, the substitution of some lesser penalty was a
modification of the terms of the collective agreement and therefore a violation
of an express constraint on arbitral authority. The court concluded:
We are not persuaded that the Supreme Court, in recent cases involving arbitra-
ton and the right to enforcement of arbitration agreements, intended that courts
should permit an arbitrator to render decisions which do such violence to the
clear, plain, exact and unambiguous terms of the submisson and the contract of
the contending parties.171
Even assuming the term of the collective agreement concerning just cause
was as clear as the court would have us believe, does a misinterpretation
modify the terms of the collective agreement or is it simply a mistake? This
is getting dangerously close to the Western Union doctrine: the arbitrator
has no authority to misinterpret the collective bargaining agreement. This
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patently disregards the 'final and binding' provision of the collective agree-
ment.172 If a no-modification clause exists then any interpretation of the
collective agreement which the court thinks is contrary to the "clear, plain,
exact and unambiguous terms" of the collective agreement is to be vacated.
This in effect results in a complete derogation of arbitral expertise in the
name of ascertaining the arbitrator's jurisdiction. Surely the costs of such an
approach should be examined. Is the court's judgment any better than the
arbitrator's and is this intervention worth the price? Admittedly, as the arbi-
trator's opinion appears more and more erroneous it becomes difficult to
deny a remedy. But theory does just that. If the arbitrator is wrong but has
not exceeded his jurisdiction there is no remedy in theory. That is, unless he
exceeds his jurisdiction every time he is wrong and, if this is the case let us
do away with the concept jurisdiction and power and just openly say that
either party can appeal the case and have the merits reviewed. In Truck
Drivers and Helpers Union, Local 784 v. Ulry Talbert Co.'73 an employee
was discharged for falsifying his work records. The arbitrator found that the
conduct took place but that the penalty was excessive. Management had
retained the right to discipline for proper cause and dishonesty was specifically
mentioned as a proper cause. Furthermore the arbitrator was precluded from
substituting his judgment for management's. He could only reverse its action,
if he found "that the Company's complaint against the employee was not
supported by the facts, and that the management had acted arbitrarily and
in bad faith or in violation of the express terms of this Agreement."' 74 The
Court of Appeal vacated the award because the arbitrator had substituted
his judgment for management's. There are at least two problems with the
reasoning. Does "proper cause" for discipline mean that any discipline is
justified? Surely one could argue that "proper cause' or "just cause" includes
a consideration of the severity of the penalty.175 Secondly, did the arbitrator
clearly misapply the standard he was given. Certainly the standard looks
onerous if read in a conjunctive way but a common sense approach could
very well imply a disjunctive meaning.1 6 If that is the case, the company
may have acted arbitrarily in dealing with the grievant. In the event he did
misapply this standard, is a court justified in vacating the award? 77 This is
the classic case of drafting management's rights in terms of an arbitrator's
jurisdiction, creating in effect an opportunity for appeal. This explains why
many courts have utilized the phrase "manifest infidelity" or "clearly wrong"
172 This further assumes that the court can effectively distinguish an interpretation
from a misinterpretation. A more convincing ground for vacation in this case was
the consideration of evidence not presented at the hearing. This being an 'adjudicatory
process' issue the Court could and should intervene.
173330 F.2d 562 (1964).
274 Id. 564.
175 Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Steelworkers, 69 LR.R.M. 2878 (4th Cir. 1969) held
just that. At 2879 the court states:
This rigid interpretation of the arbitrator's scope of authority is not warranted and
would be acceptable only if a contract expressly forbade the arbitrator to exercise
any discretion in fashioning the award. (emphasis added)
176 Dunau, supa note 185, 453 elaborates this argument.
177 International Association of Machinists, Dis. #8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 59
L.C. 13, (7th Cir. 1969) distinguished Ulry in that no specific provision called for dis-
charge. Otherwise the same reasoning would have been applicable.
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as a bench mark for intervention, in these cases and denotes some awareness
of institutional limitations involved. That is, they will not intervene unless
the arbitrator has applied this standard which marks both the limits of his
power and the legitimacy of management conduct, in a clearly erroneous
fashion. Possibly the better approach, if total abstention is unfeasible, would
be to put the onus of explicitness and clarity on the draftsman as is done in
the issue of arbitrability. The restraining provision must be explicit and clear
as to meaning. If it cannot be said with "positive assurance" that the restric-
tion was exceeded the court should find in favour of the award. This may
be what many courts are presently attempting to do.
The second group of cases takes the reasoning of American Thread and
Ulry one step further. A step which is inconsistent with not only the philo-
sophy of the Trilogy but the old common law position as well. These deci-
sions have applied the "clearly wrong" standard to instances where the pro-
vision misinterpreted (in the court's opinion) is not of the type that defines
substantive rights in terms of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. This intervention
amounts to an appeal on the merits notwithstanding the court's feeble
attempt to mouth the Trilogy rhetoric and conclude that jurisdiction has been
exceeded. In H. K. Porter Company Inc. v. United Saw, File and Steel
Products Workers of America, Federal Labor Union 22254178 one company
took over another and at the same time assumed responsibility for the col-
lective bargaining agreement containing the pension and insurance rights of
employees. In time the agreement was renegotiated and reference was made
to the continuance of the rights under the prior agreement with some explicit
modifications. On removal of part of the operations out of state a
dispute arose as to the pension and insurance rights of employees
let go. Arbitration was ordered and the arbitrator ruled that, not-
withstanding the sixty-five (age) and twenty-five (continuous service)
eligibility provisions, employees who had greater than twenty-five years
service but were not sixty-five years of age would get full pension and
insurance. In addition those who were sixty-five with less than twenty-five
years of service would get a pro-rated amount of pension and insurance.
Pensions were denied to those who were not sixty-five and did not have
twenty-five years of service. His reasoning was based on the fact that the
past practice of the parties indicated the pension clause was much broader
than its strict wording. In fact over a five-year span he cited twenty instances
of deviation from the wording. The Court of Appeal vacated the award.
While agreeing that past practice could be utilized in the interpretation and
construction of the agreement, it differed with the arbitrator's interpretation
of the underlying principle of these deviations. The court noted that the
deviations only accommodated people with service that totaled twenty-five
years despite a lack of continuity. Therefore the pro-rated aspect of the
arbitrator's award was erroneous.
Yet, absent any provision either, explicitly or implicitly authorizing the arbitrator's
ruling in part two of his award or any prior practice which reasonably could so
interpret it, he lacked a basis for his conclusion. As already stated, the arbitrator
may not administer his own brand of industrial justice.179
178 333 F.2d 596 (1964).
1790d. 602.
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Whether the arbitrator was right or wrong the important feature of this
case is that the court's disagreement was fatal to the award. This is the
Western Union doctrine which was apparently consigned to oblivion with
Cutler Hammer in American Manufacturing. Power or authority is not in
question here. Rather, it is because the decision is clearly wrong that it must
fail. Power or jurisdiction is used only to cloth the decision with some degree
of legitimacy in light of the Trilogy and the historical common law position. 8 0
The Torrington Company v. Metal Products Workers Union Local 1645
and the International Union of United Automobile Workers'8 reflects essen-
tially the same approach. The Court of Appeal differed with the arbitrator's
interpretation of a twenty-year past practice giving employees time off with
pay to vote in elections. A new collective agreement had been negotiated
without the incorporation of an express term continuing this policy. In the
court's opinion, in light of the fact that the company had given the union
notice that the policy was to be discontinued and the union had apparently
withdrawn a proposal to have the policy incorporated into the agreement,
the policy was no longer operative. The arbitrator interpreted the past practice
as continuing without an express provision excluding its operation. This
conflict with the reviewing court's opinion was fatal to the award.
Baldwin-Montrose Chemical Co. Inc. v. International Union, United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America 82 and Textile
Workers v. Paper Products8 3 represent cases which would not be in Pro-
fessor Christianson's ten percent because the courts agreed with the arbitra-
tor but are as equally erroneous as Torrington or H. K. Porter. In Baldwin-
Montrose the court felt the language of the agreement was "reasonably
susceptible" to the arbitrator's interpretation. The court in Paper Products,
notwithstanding a misconception of the legitimate uses of past practice,
agreed with the arbitrator's interpretation. More precisely, it met the standard
of "passibly plausible" erected in Safeway Stores v. Bakery Workers Local
111.184
Such judicial intrusions are the norm and hardly the exception. Few
cases can be found with the kind of restraint Bieski v. Eastern Auto For-
warding Co.1a5 suggests as appropriate. In that case the Court of Appeals
for the third circuit invalidated an award on an "adjudicative process" issue
of the type noted earlier. 86 In doing so the court suggested that the appro-
priate reviewing standard should be that:
... if the court is convinced both that the contract procedure was intended to
cover the dispute (arbitrability) and in addition that the intended procedure was
180 National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, (1960) 8 N.Y. 2d 377, 383, 171 N.E. 2d
302, 305, 208 N.Y.S. 2d 951, 955.
"The award should be vacated only if the arbitrator gave a completely irrational
construction to the provisions in dispute and, in effect, make a new contract for the
parties". (emphasis added) - is another twist to the same approach.
1813 62 F. 2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
182 383 F.2d 796 (1967).
183 69 L.R.R.M. 2578 (5th Cir. 1968).
184 390 F. 2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 1968).
185 396 F. 2d 32, 68 L.R.R.M. 2411 (3rd Cir. 1968).
188The court was of the opinion that both the union and the employer were
opposed in interest to the affected employees.
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adequate to provide a fair and informal decision, then review of the merits of
any decision should be limited to cases of fraud, deceit or instances of unions in
breach of their duty of fair representation.
187
However even the third circuit has declined to apply its own concoction. 188
Judicial intervention has been appropriate in a number of areas. One
isolated situation is where an arbitrator either does not write an opinion or
where it is so vague as to be unreviewable18 9 It may well be that an arbi-
trator does not have to write an opinion 90 and that the court's disregard for
the Trilogy may cause arbitrators to be purposely vague. But such a reaction
can only aggravate the harm to grievance arbitration. The adjudicative pro-
cess demands an explicit articulation of the reasoning underlying an award
and it is only in this way that courts will be educated. How can courts be
asked to defer to the arbitrator's expertise if it is not demonstrated. The
"mystical cult" perception of arbitral reasoning will not suffice.
Another related area is the "adjudicative process" issues. The rationale
and legitimacy is identical to the arbitrability cases dealing with the same
considerations. Should, the adversary nature of adjudication in grievance
arbitration be impaired by fraud, 191 a biased or potentially biased arbitrator,
92
lack of notice, 93 the exclusion of relevant evidence,'94 or argumentation by
parties who are not in fact adverse in interest, 195 the award will be set
aside. All of these cases involve the integrity of the adjudicative process. In
light of the courts expertise in this area, the costs of judicial intervention as
well as being minimized are outweighed by the preservation of industrial
due process.
18768 L.R.R.M. 2411, 2415 (3rd Cir. 1968).
188 Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Harold A. Fletcher, 59 L.C. 13,201
(3rd Cir. 1969), rev'g 56 LC. 12,207 (D.C. Pa. 1967). "We hold that a labor arbi-
trator's award does 'draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement' if the
interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the
light of its language, its content, and any other indicia of the parties' intention. Only
where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by the
principles of contract construction and the law of the shop may a reviewing court
disturb the award".
189 Telephone Co. v. Telephone Workers, 74 L.R.R.M. 2685 (D.C. Mass. 1970)
remanded back to arbitration. But c.f. Dis. 50, Mine Workers v.Bowman Transporta-
tion Inc., 73 L.R.R.M. 2317 (5th Cir. 1970) where ambiguities were resolved in favour
of the award. My position is not that this latter approach is inappropriate. Only if the
award is so obfuscated that it is impossible to tell what the arbitrator did as opposed
to being merely ambiguous, should the court refer it back to him. (Note: this is not
vacation per se).
1 90 See Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in United Steelworkers of America v. Enter-
prise Wheel and Car Corporation, (1960), 363 U.S. 593.
191 Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America Local
385 v. Penobscot Poultry Co., 43 L.C. 17,302 (D.C. Me. 1961).
102 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 59 L.C. 13,055.
(Sup. Ct. 1968; Colony Liquor Distributors Inc. v. Local 669, 74 LR.R.M. 2945
(A.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'g 74 L.R.R.M. 2942.
103 Peterson v. Building Service Employees Int'l Union, 59 L.C. 51,993 (N.Y.S.C.
1968).
194 Harvey Aluminum Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal.
1967).
105 Bieski v. Eastern Auto Forwarding Co., 396 F. 2d 32, 68 L.R.R.M. 2411 (3d
Cir. 1968).
[VOL. 9, NO. 3
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
One other area where the court has freely intervened is in the area of
public policy. An award may appear to conflict with a particular legislative
dictate,19 6 or require an unlawful act.197
The courts have even intervened when an award has conflicted with
nothing more than a community value.9 8 However this latter instance
has disappeared in recent years.' 99 One problem in this area lies in
the court's ability to ascertain just what the community values are and what
flows from them. Certainly they have to be balanced against national labor
relations policy and in recent years the latter has had predominant weight.
But in general, public policy intervention is a proper application of the re-
commended calculus. The policy-maker model of grievance arbitration is
limited by the institutional structure of adjudication. Who would present the
argument on the existence and interpretation of relevant legislation or com-
munity values? Would it be within the parties' interest or abilities to do so?
Does the arbitrator possess the skills and knowledge to detect and interpret
relevant legislation? Certainly the court is better equipped in the area of
legislative interpretation. However the practical realities of the situation
prompt an arbitrator to deal with relevant legislation. An award issued in
contravention of the legislation will be invalidated; therefore it appears sense-
less to neglect its presence. At the same time, his reference to and use of such
legislation may invalidate the award on the basis of an excess of jurisdiction.
To say that the court is more competent may not be accurate if the legislation
is well known to arbitrators. Even if this is the case, the requirement of two
adjudications seems wasteful. These conflicting considerations will have to be
resolved in the near future.
The approach taken by the American courts in the area of judicial
review of labor arbitration awards is one of restrained intervention. The
arbitrator has primary jurisdiction, but after such jurisdiction has been
exercised the court will grant full review if in their opinion the arbitrator's
reasoning is invalid. The restraint is embodied in standards such as clearly
unreasonable, irrational or in violation of the clear, exact and unambiguous
language. However little uniformity is apparent and review as granted in
Torrington is a carrot obtainable for all who are willing and able to pay the
cost. After abstaining on the issue of arbitrability the courts apparently feel
that once the expertise has been rendered they are quite capable of evaluating
the results. Any other course of action would be the equivalent of a
"rubber stamp".
196 Electrical Workers Local 453 v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F. 2d 25 (3d Cir.) cert.
denied 373 U.S. 949 (1963) rev'g 206 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) and 201 F. Supp.
213 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). An employee was convicted of gambling on company premises.
There was a company rule prohibiting this and he was discharged. The arbitrator
thought this was too severe and the Court of Appeal reversed the District Court which
vacated the award. This vacation was on the basis that public policy had been vindi-
cated by the conviction in a criminal action. See also Int'l Association of Machinists #8
v. Campbell Soup Co., 59 L.C. 13,266 (7th Cir. 1969).
197 Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520 I.L.G.W.U., 283 F. 2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied 366 U.S. 950 (1961). An award ordered the company to bargain (due to
a wage reopener) with a union no longer the exclusive representative of the employees.
398 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P. 2d 905 (1955), cert.
dismissed 35 U.S. 292 (1956).
199 Supra, note 196.
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Fact and theory are in conflict and this must be exposed. The references
to jurisdiction, power, authority or the intention of the parties are simply
guises. The court should admit to this. Once done, a meaningful discussion
related to the need for a limited form of appeal to the court can be enter-
tained. This day and age may have rendered the theory of exclusive arbitral
jurisdiction obsolete and standards similar to "clearly unreasonable" may
accommodate the institutional limitations of a court in the industrial rela-
tions system.
Judicial Review of Grievance Arbitration in Canada
The Statutory Structure0 0
The most important piece of labor legislation in the United States is
the National Labour Relations Act. This is because of the plenary inter-
pretation accorded to the federal power to regulate interstate commerce.20 1
In expressly wording the N.L.R.A. to cover enterprises "affecting commerce",
Congress appeared to extend the Act to the full limit of its constitutional power.
In Wickard v. Filburn, Congress was held to have authority under the commerce
clause to regulate even the production of wheat consumed entirely at the farm
on which it was grown because changes in the volume of such wheat could affect
the supply and demand for grain sold across state boundaries. Since the Wickard
case, the commerce power has been held to extend to used car dealers, grocery
stores, newspapers selling but 11h% of their copies in other states, maintenance
firms and a host of other activities having but a slender relationship to inter-
state commerce. There would seem to be very few, if any, business enterprises
whose activities have no discernible effect upon the commerce between the
States. 202
This legislative framework, containing sections 203 (d) and 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, permitted a uniform approach to griev-
ance arbitration by federal courts. This development was of critical im-
portance in light of the general ineffectiveness of state arbitration legislation.
The Canadian approach has been fragmentary in comparison. The
Canadian equivalent to the commerce power has received a very restrictive
interpretation at the hands of first, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council and now, the Supreme Court of Canada. The federal power supports
only labor legislation that regulates federal enterprises.20 3 Consequently the
most important labour legislation is enacted separately by each province.
Notwithstanding the similarity between the two industrial relations systems
regulation in Canada is predominantly provincial and an analysis of grievance
arbitration will reflect this fragmented nature.
Aside from these areas of federal authority, labour legislation is a matter for the
Provinces which may lawfully enact such legislation (eg. collective bargaining
200 Carrothers, Labour Arbitration in Canada, supra note 9; Carrothers, Collective
Bargaining in Canada, supra note 9; Woods, supra note 9.
201 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation
(1937), 301 U.S. 1.
202 Cox and Bok, Cases and Materials on Labor Law, (1969) 116.
203 Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, [1937] A. C.
326 (P.C.) commonly referred to as The Labour Conventions Case. It has received
substantial criticism over the years and one of its authors, took the unusual step, for a
judge, of uttering his own public mea culpa - in effect, a retrospective dissent. See
McWhinney, Federal Supreme Courts and Constitutional Review (1967), 45 Can.
B. Rev. 578, 587. Another case is Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925]
A.C. 396, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5, [1925] 1 W.W.R. 785.
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enactments or minimum wage statutes or general factory acts) in relation to
industries and enterprises in each Province, regardless of their economic position
vis-a-vis the country as a whole and regardless of the economic consequences of
local regulation. This need not be an ultimate unchangeable position but the
portents of change are not yet clearly visible. The present constitutional position
in Canada is in marked contrast to that in the United States. 204
Each province has labour legislation designed to regulate relations
within that province.205 This legislation has some distinctive and important
differences from its United States counterpart. Although the basic structures
are identical to the Wagner Act, which was used as a model,206 the provisions
relating to grievance arbitration and the right to strike differ substantially.
Whereas section 203(d) of the United States Labor-Management Relations
Act recommends "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining", the
labour legislation of nine provinces and that of the federal government
require that such a mechanism be provided. In five Acts (federal, Manitoba,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia) 207 it is prescribed that
final settlement be by "arbitration or otherwise". Similarly, in Alberta and
British Columbia it may be by arbitration "or such other method as may be
agreed upon by the parties".208 In the Ontario Act, arbitration alone is speci-
fied for final settlement of disputes arising during the contract term.209 In
Quebec there is an alternative not to arbitration itself, but to the method
of arbitration. 210 In Saskatchewan, if the parties have included a final settle-
ment provision in the agreement, the provision must be complied with.211
Prince Edward Island has recently amended the arbitration provision to read
like the Ontario provision.2 12
204 Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (1966) 435.
205 (Federal) Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, C.L-1, Part V. Alberta Labour
Act R.S.A. 1970, c.196. British Columbia, Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c 205;
as amended by S.B.C. 1961, c. 31; 1963, c.20; as amended by the Mediation Com-
mission Act, 1968, c 26; 1970, c. 16.
Manitoba, Labour Relations Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L10 as amended by S.M. 1970,
c.46, 1971, c. 60 effective September 1, 1971; 1971, c. 86 effective on proclamation.
New Brunswick, Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 124 as amended by S.N.B.
1953, c. 21; 1956, c. 43; 1959, c. 56; 1960, c. 45; 1961, c. 52; 1966, c. 73. Newfoundland,
Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1952, c. 258 as amended by S.N. 1959, No. 1; 1960, No.
58; 1963, No. 82; 1966, No. 39; 1967, No. 12; 1968, No. 71. Nova Scotia, Trade Union
Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 311 as amended by S.N.S. 1968, c. 59; 1969, c. 79; 1970, c. 5;
1971, c. 61; 1971, c. 60 effective April 8, 1971. Ontario, Labour Relations Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 232, effective September 1, 1971. Prince Edward Island, The Industrial Rela-
tions Act, S.P.E. I., 1971, c. 35. Quebec, Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 141 as amended
by 1965, c. 14; 1968, c. 19; 1968, c. 45; 1969, c. 20, 1969, c. 47; 1969, c. 48; 1969, c. 14;
1969, c. 26; 1970, c. 33, 1971, Bill 61 effective July 7, 1971. Saskatchewan, The Trade
Union Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 87 as amended by 1966, c. 83; 1968, c. 79; 1969, c. 66.
206 Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada (1957).
207 Federal, s. 125, Manitoba, s. 23; New Brunswick, s. 18; Newfoundland, s. 19;
Nova Scotia, s. 19.
208 Alberta, s. 78; British Columbia, s. 22.
209 Ontario, s. 37.
210 Quebec, s. 88-90.
211 Saskatchewan, s. 23A - s. 23B.
212 P.E.I s. 36.
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In addition to the mandatory nature of dispute settling mechanisms, all
jurisdictions other than Saskatchewan prohibit strikes and lockouts during
the term of the collective agreement.
213
The arbitration legislation was and remains applicable to grievance
arbitration unlike its United States counterpart. Therefore, except in Ontario,
Alberta and Manitoba 214 where labour legislation specifically precludes the
application of arbitration legislation, grievance arbitration is enforced and
reviewed by the arbitration statute of the respective province.215 Enterprises
regulated under the federal labour legislation do not have access to any pro-
vincial arbitration legislation. That labour legislation is viewed as a complete
code, rendering provincial legislation inoperative.216 It would therefore appear,
as is the case in Manitoba, that the review and enforcement of arbitration
awards in relation to a federal enterprise is subject to the common law
doctrines and the inherent jurisdiction of the court.217 In Ontario the labour
legislation provides for the enforcement of awards by filing them in the
office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court in same way as a judgment or
order of that court.218 No review is provided for by that legislation but
because the wording of the Act makes arbitration the sole means for settling
disputes, a board is regarded as a statutory tribunal and therefore subject to
prerogative writs.
219
The Alberta labour legislation provides for a very strict review by the
courts. 220 In Saskatchewan the Minister may establish a Board of Conciliation
to deal with disputes and this can be requested by the parties.
221
In British Columbia, notwithstanding an arbitration clause, an alternative
method of dealing with grievances is open to the parties (if not excluded
213 Canada Labour Code, s. 128; Alberta, s. 101; British Columbia, s. 23; Manitoba,
s. 26; New Brunswick, s. 21; Newfoundland, s. 23; Nova Scotia, s. 23; Quebec, s. 95.
Ontario, (s. 36) and P.E.I. (s. 35) a no strike - no lock out provision is mandatory in
every collective agreement.
214 Manitoba, s. 25(1), Alberta, s. 78, Ontario, s. 37.
215 Atlantic Sugar Refineries Limited and The Bakery and Confectionery Workers
International Union of America, Local 443 (1961), 27 D.L.R. 310; 61 C.L.L.C.
15,375 (N.B.S.C.)
210 Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Polymer Corp. Ltd.
66 C.L.L.C. 14,111 (O.H.CJ. 1966).
217 Canadian Co-operative Implements Ltd. v. Local 3960, United Steelworkers of
America, 69 C.L.L.C. 14,207 (Man. Q.B., 1969).
218 s. 37.
210 Re International Nickel Co. of Canada Ltd. and Rivando, 56 C.L.L.C. 15,263
(Ont. C.A. 1956); Regina v. Arthurs et al ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co.,
68 C.L.L.C. 14,136 (S.C.C. 1968).
In Quebec it appears the prerogative writs do not apply. Canadian Br. Aluminum
Co. Ltd. v. Dufresne, 64 C.L.L.C. 14,029 (Q.S.C.); and Aluminum Co. of Canada v.
Syndicat National des Employee's de L'Aluminum d'Arivida, 68 C.L.L.C. 14,082
(Q.Q.B.); c.f., Commission des Ecoles Catholiques de Shavinigan v. Roy et al 66
C.L.L.C. 14,105 (Q.S.C. 1964).
220 s. 78. Vacation is to be granted where the arbitrator has misconducted himself,
the award has been improperly procured, the judge is of the opinion that a question is
not arbitrable, but the arbitrator decided that it was and finally where the Board made
an error of law on the face of the award regardless of whether the question of law was
submitted to be determined by the arbitrator or arbitration board.
221 s.21, s.22.
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by the collective agreement). Either party may request the registrar appointed
under the Labour Relations Act to assign an official of the labour department
to assist the parties to settle the dispute. After the registrar has considered
the issue, he may appoint an officer or refer the matter directly to the labour
relations board. The board considers whether or not the matter is arbitrable.
It may then order the parties to arbitrate the dispute, or rule that the matter
is not arbitrable, or make a final binding decision or arbitration award.
Under any of these circumstances a Board order is enforceable as a judgment
when filed with the Supreme Court of British Columbia and under the last
possibility the Arbitration Act of British Columbia does not apply by express
exclusion.2
22
To forestall any impasse over arbitrability, under four statutes (Alberta,
British Columbia, Newfoundland and Ontario) it is required that an arbitra-
tion clause include "any question as to whether the differences are arbitrable".
However the impact of this provision when a court reviews an award is
dubious and its meaning has been interpreted to mean substantive arbitrability
only.223 In addition, provision is made (by nine statutes) for the insertion
in the agreement of a final settlement clause by government action if the
parties have not done so by negotiation.2 24 Under the federal, New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island labour legislation, either party may
request the labour relations board to prescribe a clause, which becomes
binding as part of the agreement. In British Columbia, with or without
request, the Minister may prescribe such a clause. The Alberta, Manitoba,
Newfoundland and Ontario Acts spell out the wording of a final settlement
clause for insertion should the agreement not contain one.
Judicial Review of Grievance Arbitration Awards
The United States Supreme Court has responded to the legislative
deference accorded to grievance arbitration with a deference of its own. This
deference can be justified on institutional or functional grounds quite apart
from any legislative recommendation. In Canada, with the same institutional
considerations present and with a more conspicuous legislative policy in
favour of grievance arbitration discernible, an even more responsive position
by the Canadian judiciary would be expected. This has not occurred nor is
there any indication that it will occur in the near future. The Canadian courts
have adopted a position that is antithetical to the Steelworkers Trilogy. Little
if any deference is accorded to grievance arbitration. Furthermore, there is no
indication that the Canadian courts appreciate the institutional considerations
2 2 2 s.22 (1) (b).
223 Regina v. Weiler et al ex parte Union Carbide Can. Ltd. 68 C.L.L.C. 14,137
(S.C.C. 1968); United Steel Corp. v. The United Steelworkers, Local 2776, [1958]
O.W.N. 105, 12 D.L.R. 2d 322. This provision appears to have no impact when the
court is reviewing the award. See Re Sudbury Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union,
Local 598 and the International Nickel Company of Canada Ltd. (1962), 32 D.L.R.
2d 494; 62 C.L.L.C. 15,417, where a Board was held to have declined its jurisdiction
by holding that a dispute was not arbitrable.
224Federal s.125; Alberta, s.78; British Columbia, s.22(2); Manitoba, s.23(2);
New Brunswick, s.18(2), Reg. 11; Newfoundland, s. 19(2),(3), Reg. 11; Nova Scotia,
s. 19(2), Reg. 11; Ontario s. 37; Prince Edward Island, s. 36.
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involved. The Canadian cases here seldom consider the American decisions. 225
This is despite the fact that Canada has adopted in toto, except for the
variations previously noted, an administrative structure identical to that exist-
ing in the United States and despite the fact that the industrial relations
systems of Canada and the United States operate in almost identical technolo-
gical, market, budgetary and power contexts. This anomaly is magnified by
the pre-occupation of Canadian courts with English doctrines developed in
a system that was and remains completely dissimilar to Canada.22 6 England
does not possess an industrial relations system of the same nature as those
of Canada and the United States. Although the technological and market
contexts are similar the power context is completely disparate. No administra-
tive agency exists at this time, to administer complex and comprehensive
legislation designed to regulate industrial relations. Industrial interaction
between the employer and union could be characterized as extremely informal
in comparison to its Canadian or American analogue. Indeed the proliferation,
functions, responsibilities, and importance of administrative agencies so com-
mon to Canada and the United States would appear foreign to the United
Kingdom. However, the Canadian courts, long after the abolition of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a final court of appeal, persist in
applying English doctrines to institutions that are alien to English life. Such
a tenacious resistence to consider Canadian reality and requisites can only be
attributed to an almost morbid attachment to the doctrine of stare decisis.
Review of grievance arbitration can be viewed from two perspectives
in Canada. One approach considers arbitration to be a private dispute settling
mechanism; the other considers grievance arbitration to be a statutory tri-
bunal. Both judicial approaches are devoid of industrial relations and insti-
tutional considerations. Each view is reminiscent of the Cutler Hammer
doctrine rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
Consensual Grievance Arbitration
Labour legislation making a final and binding dispute settling mechanism
mandatory while not specifically requiring arbitration is considered private or
consensual. 227 It is treated with no more or less deference than that accorded
to commercial arbitration boards. Judicial review is available and awards
will be vacated if bias, fraud, an absence of natural justice, an excess of juris-
diction or an error of law on the face of the record exists. 228 This appears
225 Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Transport and General Workers v. B. C.
Airlines Ltd. and Pacific Western Airlines Ltd., 70 C.L.L.C. 14,064 (B.C.S.C. 1970) is
one of the few cases to cite and apply American doctrine. The case revolves around
the impact of a corporate merger on a collective agreement and the John Wiley approach
is taken, rejecting an archaic English legal doctrine that had no relevance to industrial
relations, [The author notes that this decision has been reversed, [1971] 2 W.W.R. 466].
220 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, 1965-1968
Report. Great Britain is about to jettison their existing legal framework and adopt the
Canadian and American structures.22T Howe Sound Company v. International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers (Canada), Local 663, 62 C.L.L.C. 15,047A (S.C.C. 1962); Western Plywood
Ltd. v. International Woodworkers, 64 C.L.L.C. 14,033 (A.S.C. 1964).
228 Rex. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal Ex parte Shaw, [1952]
1 K.B. 338, 351.
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to be the case in both jurisdictions where the court proceeds under the
provincial arbitration legislation229 and where such legislation has been
rendered inoperative by labour legislation and the court intervenes on the
basis of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
230
The doctrine of an error of law on the face of record has been synop-
sized as follows:
The reviewing court has exclusive power to define the exact issues of law or fact
which the parties have specifically agreed in their contract to submit to the
arbitrator for his determination. Where the parties have agreed to submit to him
the whole dispute between them without separating out specific issues of law or
fact, no part of their agreed submission (except presumably the narrow request
for determination) is deemed to be the reference of specific issues. The court
has full power to set aside the arbitrator's award on the ground of any error of
law which he commits in the course of his determination of the specific issues
referred to him, which error is outside the scope of the award. However, within
the scope of the exact issues specifically referred to the arbitrator, the court will
not interfere with his determination even if the court is of the opinion that the
arbitrator has erred. In the context of this doctrine, the term "law" includes
court rules of evidence and of documentary interpretation as well as the arbi-
trator's interpretation of the relevant document itself.
2 3'
This doctrine does not appear to have developed in the early American
approach to arbitration. It appears that "error of law on the face" as it
relates to private tribunals was established in 1802 and no one has been
able to resist its "compelling logic" since. States Lord Denning in Rex v.
Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal,232 the cornerstone to the
Canadian approach to grievance arbitration 33 notwithstanding its remote
factual context:
Leaving now statutory tribunals, I turn to the awards of arbitrators. The Court
of King's Bench never interfered by certiorari with the award of an arbitrator,
because it was a private tribunal and not subject to the prerogative writs. If the
award was not made a rule of court, the only course available to an aggrieved
party was to resist an action on the award or to file a bill in equity. If the award
was made a rule of court, a motion could be made to the court to set aside for
misconduct of the arbitrator on the ground that it was procured by corruption or
other undue means: see 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15. At one time an award could not
be upset on the ground of error of law by the arbitrator, because that could not
be said to be misconduct or undue means; but ultimately it was held in Kent v.
Elstob (1802) 3 East 18, that an award could be set aside for error of law on
the face of it. This was regretted by Williams J. in Hodgkinson v. Fernie (1857)
3 C.B. N.S. 189, but is now well established. This remedy by motion to set aside
is, however confined to arbitrators.
229 International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-71 v. Weldwood of Canada
Ltd. 70 C.L.L.C. 14,033 (B.C.C.A. 1970). See also Schiff, Labour Arbitration Proce-
dures, Study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations (Canada) 24 (1968).
230 Canadian Co-operative Implements Ltd. v. Local 3960, United Steelworkers of
America, 69 C.L.L.C. 14,207 (Man. Q.B. 1969); Schiff, supra note 229; Regina v.
Arthurs et al ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. supra note 11.
231 Schiff, supra note 229, 25. Outlined in Attorney-General for Manitoba v. Kelly,
[1922] 1 A.C. 268, 275; Government of Kelatan v. Duff Development Company Ltd.,
[1923] A.C. 395, 409; Faubert and Watts v. Temagami Mining Co. Ltd., [1960] S.C.R.
235, 241.
232 Supra note 228.
233 Regina v. Arthurs et al ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company, 68 C.L.L.C.
14,136 (S.C.C. 1968).
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We are left with an extremely penetrating review of these so-called
private tribunals. 2 4 Not only can a court intervene for fraud, bias or excess
of jurisdiction; but also when an error of law is apparent on the face of the
record. Of course, if the error of law is the specific issue referred to the
tribunal the court is powerless. 235 This stems from the consensual nature of
the tribunal. The parties have contracted for an arbitrator's opinion and his
alone. To intervene in such a situation would be to entertain an appeal and
this would encroach upon the parties' ability to freely contract. A collateral
question of law, not specifically submitted to the arbitrator, is presumably
not within this rubric of party intention. Consequently, a party should not be
precluded from achieving court review of this matter. It is said that the
courts are the experts in questions of law of the collateral variety.
The simplicity of the doctrine conceals the monumental problems in
its application. This is without first questioning the appropriateness of the
doctrine to grievance arbitration. Initially, what is a question of law?
Secondly, when is it collateral? In answering these two questions, the Cana-
dian courts have been able to expand or contract the scope of review at
whim. This phenomenon is magnified by the nature of a filed grievance.
Executed in the shop by laymen, it is a general allegation and most certainly
does not separate those issues of fact and law specifically referred to the
arbitrator. This leaves the court, by virtue of the law of commercial arbitra-
tion, in a position of complete review.23 6 However most courts have pro-
ceeded, by distilling those issues specifically submitted as opposed to the
collateral questions of law.
A paradigm of the expansionary nature in the scope of review is the
interpretation of a collateral issue of law presented in Shipping Federation of
British Columbia and International Longshorer's and Warehousemen's Union,
Local 501.237 In that case, two gangs refused to work when dispatched to
another port, on the grounds that each gang should consist of thirteen workers
instead of eleven, in accordance with the conditions prevailing in that port.
234 See Abel, Materials Proper For Consideration in Certiorari To Tribunals: I.
(1963), 15 U. of T. L.J. 102 for an excellent analysis of the confusion in determining
what is an error of law on the face.
235 A.B.C. Sheet Metal and Plumbing Ltd. and United Association of Journeymen
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Union 170, 62 C.L.L.C. 15,394
(B.C.C.A. 1962); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 115 v. Ben Ginter
Construction Co. Ltd., 66 C.L.L.C. 14,163 (B.C.S.C. 1966); Re The Bay Co. (B.C.)
v. Local 170 of the Pipefitting Industry, 60 C.L.L.C. 15, 325 (B.C.S.C. 1960). It should
be noted, once the court holds that this is a specifically referred issue, that ends the
inquiry no matter how erroneous the decision was. These cases attest to that. See also
General Drivers Union v. Norton, 63 C.L.L.C. 15,489 (Man. Q.B. 1963) and Bakery
and Confectionery Workers Union v. Mammy's Ltd. 66 C.L.L.C. 14,147 (Nfld. S.C.
1965). However it should be further noted that jurisdiction, as a grounds of review,
impinges upon this finality. For as we shall see, an interpretation that is clearly erro-
neous, in the court's opinion, will not stand. It will be quashed for an excess of juris-
diction. See Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd. v. Flin Flon Base Metal
Workers' Union, 66 C.L.L.C. 14,166 (Man. Q.B. 1966).
236 Daley v. Royale Excavating Co. Ltd. (1961), 28 D.L.R. (2d) 514, 61 C.L.L.C.
15,377 (Nfld. S.C. 1961). The court held that the arbitrator must insist on a precise
written statement of the issues (See, Schiff, op cit.)
287 60 C.LL.C. 15,277 (B.C. S.C. 1960).
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They were suspended for insurbordination and lodged a grievance claiming
the collective agreement stipulated that when gangs are sent to another port
they are to be governed by the working conditions in that port. The arbi-
tration board ruled that the Federation's unilateral reduction of the size of
the gang entitled the union to conclude that the Federation no longer intended
to be bound by the agreement and thus, the union was discharged from
further performance of its contractual duties. The Federation sought review
and the British Columbia Supreme Court held that the issue for decision by
the arbitrators was:
Did the Shipping Federation on March 23rd, 1959, breach the Collective Agree-
ment of February 16th, 1959 by suspending Gangs 53 and 73 and fill-ins from
all work?
All other matters were collateral. The court could therefore review the
arbitrator's interpretation of the specific provisions of the collective agree-
ment as they were collateral to the main issue phrased by the court.
Again, in -Re Columbia Packing Co. Ltd. and Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 212,238 the Supreme
Court held that the interpretation of the collective agreement was a collateral
question of law. In deciding whether an employee was wrongfully dismissed,
the arbitrators held that the collective agreement maintained an unlimited
right of discharge. The court disagreed with this interpretation being of the
opinion that a relevant provision had been disregarded. The arbitrators had
therefore erred in the determination of a question of law that had become
material as distinct from the case in which a specific question of law is
referred to them for decision.
Similarly in Re Alberta Wheat Pool and Grain Workers Union, Local
333239 the British Columbia Supreme Court disagreed with a holding of a
board of arbitrators that granted wages to an employee for time lost due to
illness. The court felt that the board had misconstrued the agreement and
that this misconstruction was reviewable. The court stated:
This is not a reference in which a specific point of law was submitted for arbi-
tration but is one in which a question of construction and of law arises as being
material in the matter referred.249
Hence interpretations and constructions of a collective agreement,
facilitating the ultimate determination of "rightness" or "wrongness", are
collateral questions or issues of law and reviewable by the court. The reason-
ing is a spurious attempt to rationalize a full appeal on the merits. The end
result detrimentally affects the values of private arbitration: assuming recourse
is made to grievance arbitration because of its speed, expense, informality
and availability of arbitral expertise. Until the passage of labour legislation
the courts had consistently refused to enforce the collective labour agree-
238 62 C.L.L.C. 15,408 (B.C. S.C. 1962).
239 63 C.L.L.C. 15,449 (B.C. S.C. 1962).
24 0 1d. In International Woodworkers of America Local 1423 v. S & K Ltd., 62
C.LL.C. 15,402 (B.C.C.A. 1961) The British Columbia Court of Appeal quashed an
award re-instating a discharged employee. The question of "proper cause" was said to
be a collateral issue of law and therefore reviewable when the error in such a deter-
mination is on the face of the award and it was.
19711
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
ment.241 Unfamiliarity with collective agreements is reflected in the findings
of collateral error of laws by applying traditional contract doctrine; doctrine
that evolved quite apart from an industrial context. Professor Summers has
argued that there is no necessary logic to such an application. 242 Indeed, it
entirely misconceives the nature of contractual law as well as the purposive
nature of legal reasoning.
Not only does a collateral error of law encompass an erroneous inter-
pretation of an agreement; it strikes at the very understructure of the adjudi-
cative process. Collateral errors of law have been found if the arbitrator has
set an "incorrect" burden of proof,243 improperly used "extrinsic" evidence, 244
failed to use the doctrine of collateral estoppel in just the manner that courts
do,245 failed to apply the common law rules of wrongful dismissal, 246 im-
properly applied the procedural provision of a collective agreement,247 or
improperly excluded evidence.2 43 This leaves the courts with powers of
complete review over the procedure of grievance arbitration. A failure to
apply traditional rules of evidence or procedure is generally fatal to the
award.
It was argued above that this approach is unwise. Arbitral expertise is
needed in these matters of procedure. The arbitrator should be able to
fashion a procedural structure based on the needs of this system. These
issues can be considered as neutral in that they apply equally to both parties
of an agreement.249 Moreover, the arbitrator can look for guidance to the
many dispute settling institutions that surround him. The present Canadian
approach, impinges upon the speed, expense, informality and effectiveness
of grievance arbitration.
The concept of jurisdiction in Canada is similar to the casuistry of the
American courts on this issue. However Canadian courts are without the
benefit of the Trilogy to remind them of industrial relations requirements.
Jurisdiction is defined in abstract "logic" with no consideration of the func-
tional limitations of courts. The cases are somewhat more complex than the
241 Supra note 72.
242 Supra note 54. For a refreshing change from this sterile enterprise see, Cana-
dian Brotherhood of Railway Transport and General Workers v. B.C. Airlines Ltd.,
supra note 225.
243S & K Ltd. and International Woodworkers of America, Local 1423, 62
C.L.L.C. 15,397 (B.C. S.C. 1961); Peter's Ice Cream Co. Ltd. and Milk Sales Drivers
Union Local 464, 61 C.L.L.C. 15,355 (B.C. S.C. 1961).
244 Re International Union of Operating Engineers and Ben Ginter Construction
Co. Ltd. 65 C.L.L.C. 14,066 (B.C. S.C. 1965).
245 Re International Union of Operating Engineers Local 115 and Ben Ginter Con-
struction Co. Ltd., 67 C.L.L.C. 14,032 (B.C. S.C. 1967).
246 Canadian Gypsum Co. Ltd. and Nova Scotia Quarryworkers Union, 60 C.L.L.C.
15,268 (N.S.S.C. 1959).
247 Re Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-op. Assoc., 68 C.L.L.C. 14,079 (B.C. S.C.
1968). Here the court extended what is now a fiction, the individual employment con-
tract to preserve a right to arbitrate. c.f. Polymer Corp. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers, 62 C.L.L.C. 15,406 (S.C.C. 1962) aff'g 61 C.LL.C. 15,341.
248 Re Arbitration Between Super-Valu Stores (B.C.) Ltd. and Retail Food and
Drug Clerks, 60 C.LL.C. 15,304 (B.C. S.C. 1960).
249 Weiler, op. cit. supra note 12.
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American because of the doctrines of "error of law on the face". At times,
an excess or declination of jurisdiction is considered to be an error of law
on the face of the record and collateral to the specific question referred. It
is therefore reviewable. 250 However a more "logical" view, is that jurisdiction
is a grounds for review independent of any error of law on the face.251 In
either event, the standard for review is the same. The decision is not review-
able if the interpretation given by the arbitrator is one that the words will
reasonably bear.252 This standard is imposed in situations where a party's
rights have been phrased without reference to the terms of arbitral jurisdic-
tion. It is simply a situation where the court feels the arbitrator is wrong and
it is the intensity of this feeling that is determinative. If the court feels so
strongly, that it can say that the words are not reasonably susceptable to such
an interpretation, the award will be quashed. This reasoning has very few
constraints, and those that exist are not of an objective variety. The common
law position that the parties are free to contract for final and binding arbi-
tration is illusory. The arbitrator can be wrong but not clearly wrong. To
be clearly wrong, is to lack jurisdiction. In other words, the Cutler Hammer
doctrine, abolished in the United States because it could only have a crippling
effect on grievance arbitration, thrives in Canada. The cases are rife with
semantical analysis devoid of functional relevance.
253
250 Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co. v. Flin Flon Base Metal Workers, 66
C.L.L.C. 14,166 (Man. Q.B. 1966); Sooke Forest Products Ltd. v. International
Woodworkers of America, 70 C.L.L.C. 14,011 B.C.C.A. 1970)
251 This is apparent from noting the effect of a privative clause on a statutory tri-
bunal. Jurisdictional questions are all that remain. See Ontario Labour Relations Board;
Bradley v. Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. (1957), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 65. This is
accepted in International Woodworkers of America v. Weldwood of Canada Ltd.,
70 C.L.L.C. 14,033 (B.C.C.A. 1970).
252 Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Co. v. Flin Flon Base Metal Workers, 66
C.L.L.C. 14,166 (Man. Q.B. 1966). This test appears to be favoured in Howe Sound
Co. v. Mine Workers Union, 62 C.L.L.C. 15,047 A (S.C.C. 1962) and International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting
Co. Ltd., 68 C.L.L.C. 14,069 (S.C.C. 1967). In the latter case Martland J. states:
Such an interpretation of the Article is, in my opinion, not only a proper one but
is probably the right one. But whether right or wrong, in my view the board
interpreted and did not amend the agreement. This being so, it did not exceed
its jurisdiction and its award is valid.
This circular reasoning leads us to the position that if the arbitrator's effort was
improper, the agreement would be amended and therefore he would lack jurisdiction.
Question: Who is in the best position to decide what is proper?
253 See, Weiler, The 'Slippery Slope' of Judicial Intervention (1971), 9 O.H.LJ. 1,
pp. 60 - 71. 'There are few areas of Canadian law where the Supreme Court has done
a poorer job than in its efforts in the area of the collective agreement and labour arbi-
tration. There is some hint in the literature of the area that the collective agreement
is a very peculiar and esoteric instrument for judicial administration and that labour
arbitration is such a distinctive function that it is outside the competence of the ordinary
courts. I would strongly disagree with either of these suggestions. The collective agree-
ment is a sophisticated and complex document, and its interpretation requires great
sensitivity to its special features and an understanding of its social background. These
characteristics it shares with almost all statutory or contractual interpretation. Labour
arbitration requires judgment and experience, but it is and should be a form of adjudi-
cation, and any kind of judgment requires professional craft and skill. The tragedy of
the experience I have recounted in this area is not that the Supreme Court involved
itself in an area which was peculiarly unsuited to law and courts, but rather that this
sequence of cases epitomizes all that is deficient in the conception of law and judging
which appears to be shared on our Supreme Court." (at p. 70).
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Statutory Grievance Arbitration
The other judicial approach to grievance arbitration treats arbitration
boards as statutory tribunals. The legislative policy of Ontario expressly
favours arbitration by requiring that it be the exclusive modus operandi of
solving disputes during the term of the collective agreement. 254 The courts
have held this requirement to be coercive. It forces the parties to adopt arbi-
tration. This is despite the fact that in the provinces which have adopted the
wording "arbitration or otherwise" no other viable process has developed.2 55
In fact it is difficult to envisage another viable process. The United States
experience only confirms this universality. Even though the legislation only
recommends that a process for solving contractual disputes be adopted,
arbitration clauses appear in well over 90% of all collective agreements. 258
The Ontario courts have insisted that grievance arbitration is coerced
by legislation. .Therefore the tribunals are to be treated as statutory and
supervised by prerogative writs. 257 This ruling carries with it a number of
consequences; all of which originated before the inception of grievance arbi-
tration, and all of which are unsuited to an administrative agency let alone
a grievance arbitration board. Unfortunately the Ontario courts have a very
limited conceptual repertoire.
The first case to display this "logic" was Re The International Nickel
Co. and Rivando.258 The judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal is devoid
of institutional considerations, industrial relations realities and legislative
policy. There is no attempt to distinguish grievance arbitration tribunals from
administrative agencies. The court appears oblivious to the fact that the
parties select and discharge adjudicators, that the parties "enact" the collective
agreement which is to be interpreted by these adjudicators and that they are
able to modify its terms on negotiating a new agreement. No mention is
made of the importance of grievance arbitration to the continuity of the
industrial enterprise and industrial peace generally. Moreover the Ontario
courts have ignored the American experience. These "minor" details suggest
that there is little logic in applying prerogative writs to such institutions.
Any approach taken should be fashioned to accommodate the needs and
functional structure of arbitration. Standards of review or review bodies
should be devised to curb possible arbitral abuses, without at the same time
254 Ontario, s. 37.
255 Woods, Public Policy and Grievance Arbitration in Canada, supra note 9.
Unless one can argue that the parties prefer the alternative of the British Columbia
Labour Board to the opportunity of selecting their own adjudicators to interpret the
collective agreement they have negotiated, and, who they can discharge for unsatis-
factory service.
25 Livengood, The Lawyer's Role in Grievance Arbitration, 9 Lab. L.J. 495, 496
(1958); Jones and Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the
Labor Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, supra note 141.
257Re International Nickel Co. and Rivando, 56 C.L.L.C. 15,263 (O.C.A. 1956);
Regina v. Barber et al; ex parte Warehousemen's Union 68 C.L.L.C. 14,098 (O.C.A.
1968); Regina v. Arthurs et al; ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co., 67 C.L.L.C.
14,024 (O.C.A. 1967) aff'd by 68 C.LL.C. 14,136 (S.C.C. 1968).
268 56 C.L.L.C. 15,263 (O.CA. 1956).
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eradicating the benefits or values of that process. This is the "calculus of
intervention" reflected in the approach of the United States Supreme Court
in the American and Warrior cases. This analysis encouraged that court to
erect presumptions in favour of arbitration. Presumptions if honoured respect
the expertise of an arbitrator and recognize the relative judicial unfamiliarity
with industrial relations and the nature of collective agreements. Certainly
the Canadian courts cannot claim to be more knowledgeable in these matters;
nor is their institutional design more compatible with the day to day opera-
tions of an industrial enterprise.
The Ontario courts have not considered the issues above. Grievance
arbitration tribunals may be reviewed not only on the basis of bias, fraud,
and excess or declination of jurisdiction but also for an error of law apparent
on the face of the record even if it is the specific issue submitted to the arbi-
trator. Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal259 is ritualisti-
cally cited for this proposition notwithstanding the dissimilarity between the
Eliglish tribunals and arbitration boards and administrative agencies used to
implement governmental policy in the United States and Canada.260 The
court will not interfere just because one interpretation appears more apt than
another. The standard applied for error of law on the face of the record is
whether the interpretation of the collective agreement is one that it will
reasonably bear.261 Is a court in any better position than the arbitrator to
make this interpretation? Arbitration is designed to facilitate a meaningful
interpretation; an interpretation the courts were unable or unwilling to
render. Does this standard accommodate the institutional limitations of a
court? An analysis of the cases suggests that it does not.
The Supreme Court of Canada squandered a marvelous opportunity to
correct this misapplication of doctrine in Regina v. Arthurs et al ex parte
Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co.262 Reverently citing Lord Denning's distinction
between consensual and statutory tribunals, the court squeezed grievance
arbitration into the compulsory pigeon-hole.263 This makes grievance arbi-
tration in Ontario more vulnerable to judicial review than the Ontario Labour
Relations Board. The Ontario legislation contains a privative clause,2"s that
while not rendering the Board immune from review, eliminates error of law
259 [1952] 1 K.B. 338, 351.
260 Hart and Sacks, supra note 14.
261 Regina v. Barber et al; ex parte Warehousemen's Union, 68 C.L.L.C. 14,098
(O.C.A. 1968); Re Canadian Westinghouse Co. Ltd. and Local 164, Draftsmen's Asso-
ciation of Ontario, [19621 O.R. 17; Re Sudbury, Mine, Mill and Smelter Worker's Union,
Local 598 and International Nickel Co. of Canada Ltd. 1962 O.R. 1089.
262 Supra note 257.
263 Id.
264 S. 97 No decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling of the Board shall be
questioned or reviewed in any court, and no order shall be made or process entered, or
proceedings taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, declaratory judgment,
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, or otherwise, to question, review,
prohibit, or restrain the Board on any of its proceedings.
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on the face of the record as a basis for it.265 This means that only natural
justice or jurisdictional issues will support a judicial review of the Board's
decisions; whereas the final and binding requirement of grievance arbitration
relates only to the absence of a right of appeal, not to the question of
judicial review. 20
8
Regina v. Arthurs et al; ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. 2 7 is a
paradigm approach of a Canadian court to grievance arbitration. Three
employees had absented themselves from work in order to work elsewhere.
This was a violation of an express term of the contract and they were dis-
charged. The collective agreement, in addition to that provision, contained
a management's rights clause that included the right to discharge for proper
cause and an arbitration clause which contained the vague restrictions that
the arbitrator could not modify the terms of the collective agreement. The
board of arbitration did not feel that there was proper cause for a discharge,
in light of the grievors' records of employment and seniority. A suspension
was substituted on the basis that some form of discipline was justified. The
award was quashed on review by the Ontario High Court of Justice. Mr.
Justice Brook distinguished between just cause and proper cause, holding
that the latter was much narrower in scope. To interpret proper cause in the
way the arbitration board did, was to substitute or read into the collective
agreement a term that did not exist. This modification was expressly pro-
hibited by the collective agreement and therefore the board exceeded its
jurisdiction. This excess of jurisdiction was an error of law on the face of
the record, allowing the court to quash the award. The reasoning is an exact
replication of the Western Union fatuity rejected by the United States
Supreme Court.
Is such a rigid interpretation of proper cause or of just cause justifiable?
Is the court equipped to ascertain the intention of the parties or to fashion
the needed industrial jurisprudence? The Court's semantical analysis permits
2
65 Re Ontario Labour Relations Board; Bradley v. Canadian General Electric Co.
Ltd. (1957), 8 D.L.R.(2d) 65. See also, Laskin, Certiorari to Labour Boards: The
Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses, (1952) 30 Can. B. Rev. 986; Wanczycki, Judicial
Review of Decisions of Labour Relations Boards in Canada, (1969) 16; Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796 et al, 70
C.L.L.C. 14,008 (S.C.C. 1970).
However, see Metropoltan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 796 (1970), 70 C.L.L.C. 14008 as to the significance of this distinction.
Yet Professor Weiler has recently concluded that:
'There is no doubt that the degree of defference to arbitration awards is much less
than is the case for Labour Board decisions ..
supra note 25(3) at p. 17.
200 R. v. Barber et al., supra note 257. R. v. Arthurs et al., supra note 257.
20768 C.L.L.C. 14,136 (S.e.C. 1968), rev'g 67 C.L.L.C. 14,024 (O.C.A. 1967).
Recently, legislation has been amended to modify the impact of this decision. Alberta,
R.S.A. 1970, c. 100, s. 78(2) (g)
(g) Where an employee has been suspended or dismissed the arbitration board
(i) may direct the employer to reinstate the employee and pay to the em-
ployee a sum equal to his wage loss by reason of his suspension or
dismissal or such lesser sum as, in the opinion of the arbitration board,
is fair and reasonable or
(ii) may make such other directive varying the penalty as it considers fair
and reasonable having regard to the terms of the collective agreement.
See also, Ontario R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 37(8).
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it to convert any disagreement with the arbitrator's reasoning into an excess
of jurisdiction.268 Polymer Corporation Ltd. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Union, Local 16-14269 which affirmed the power of an arbitrator to
award damages for breach of a collective agreement, was distinguished. Brook
J. felt that this was something more than fashioning a remedy. It was a
substitution, "expressly" forbidden by the collective agreement.
This judgment was reversed by the Ontario Court Appeal,270 with
Schroeder, J. A. dissenting. Mr. Justice Laskin noted that at common law
courts were not specialized agencies dealing with employment relations and
under that common law regime the discharge would probably be final. How-
ever the prevalence of collective bargaining agreements and labour legis-
lation has changed all this.271 The collective agreement leaves the extent of
discipline at large (proper cause) and in elaborating this term, the Board
was carrying out the very function assigned to it by the parties. Mr. Justice
Schroeder, in an important dissent in that it was later adopted by the
Supreme Court of Canada, held that the clear words of the collective agree-
ment must be honoured. The recognized canons of constructions must be
employed, and the ordinary natural and grammatical sense of the words used
in the collective agreement must be adopted. This deceptively suggests that
the recognized canons of construction are appropriate in an industrial rela-
tions environment and that the clear and ambiguous meaning of words can be
ascertained when divorced from the past practice and negotiating history of
the parties.2 72
Schroeder J. A. did not concur in Brook J.'s distinction between cause
and proper cause; rather neither term was to be viewed as giving the board
this power. 273 He then erected a presumption against arbitration by requiring
that any intent to give the arbitrator such power "should have been clearly
expressed in appropriate language. In the absence of such a provision there
is no authority in the board to pursue that course". 274 This error of the board
268 In Osborne & Hall, Toronto Printing Press and Assistants Union v. Weatherill
et al., 70 C.L.L.C. 14,038 (O.S.C. 1970) held that the issue of whether the error was
on the face of the record is not relevant if the error is in relation to a collateral or
preliminary matter which goes to jurisdiction. In that case the board was said to have
declined jurisdiction. Therefore, one can see that this further reduces the barriers for
intervention if court so desires, because almost any error can be converted into a
jurisdictional error.
269 62 C.L.L.C. 15,406 (S.C.C. 1962).
270 67 C.L.L.C. 14,024 (O.C.A. 1967).
271 He then cited Le Syndicat Catholique des Employes de Magasins de Quebec
Inc. v. La Compagnie Paquet Ltee, [1959] S.C.R. 206, 212-213 (S.C.C. 1959).
272 See, Summers supra note 54 for a refutation of this position as well as Farns-
worth, supra note 58.2 73 See Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Steelworkers, supra note 175, representative of
the American position, that only accepts such a rigid interpretation if a contract expressly
forbade the arbitrator to exercise any discretion in fashioning an award.
274 67 C.L.L.C. 14,024 (O.C.A. 1967) Re Sandwich, Windsor Amherstburg Railway
Co. (1961), 26 D.LR.(2d) 704 (O.C.A. 1961) also illustrates a presumption against
grievance arbitration and industrial relations considerations. Oblivious to the impact
of labour legislation, Aylesworth J.A. held that it is a prerogative right of management
to discharge employees and that it can be cut down only if the agreement is clearly
to that effect. R. v. McCulloch et al; ex parte Dowty Equipment of Canada Ltd., 69
C.L.L.C. 14,173 (O.C.A. 1969) is a case where the collective agreement met this
requirement of clarity.
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was then characterized as an excess of jurisdiction and an error of law
apparent on the face of the record. Thus we see the interwoven nature of
these two notions which is conveniently separated if a privative clause
exists.2 75 In addition, the evidence of the length of service of the offending
employees was held to be irrelevant and extraneous to the issue. It's use also
resulted in an error of law on the face of the record, sufficient to quash the
award. The Supreme Court of Canada in a judgment by Mr. Justice Judson
reversed the Court of Appeal and agreed with Schroeder J.A. Once the
board found facts to justify discipline, the particular form chosen was not
subject to review on arbitration.
276
In Regina v. Barber et al; ex parte Warehousemen and Miscellaneous
Driver's union, Local 419278 the reviewing court disagreed with the arbitra-
tor's interpretation of the collective agreement. This disagreement was fatal
to the award. The issue was whether a part-time employee who had suffered
a prolonged illness could claim benefits under the insurance welfare plan
provided by the collective agreement. The board of arbitrators held that the
provision in the agreement was ambiguous, permitting them to consider the
extrinsic evidence of 1) the master policy which was intended to discharge
this obligation, and 2) the past practice that such a claim had never been
allowed before. This extrinsic evidence went against the grievor and his
claim was denied. The Ontario High Court quashed the award. The agree-
ment was held not to be ambiguous; hence the use of extrinsic evidence
disregarded the plain meaning of the words and gave them an interpretation
they could not reasonably bear. This was an excess of jurisdiction and was
an error on the face of the record.
Mr. Justice Jessup of the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the High
Court. He stated:
In my view articles 7.02 and 14.03 of the present collective agreement are
incapable of being regarded as ambiguous either latently or patently under any
principle of construction which the law countenances. On their face they are
clearly unambiguous.
He then went on to assert:
I see no difficulty in applying such articles to all classes of employees.
Such a mechanistic approach to contractual interpretation is difficult to
justify in a normal contractual setting let alone when applied to a collective
bargaining agreement. The meaning of words cannot be divined by an
a priori process divorced from the context in which they were negotiated.
The parol evidence rule is presently under attack and often circumvented in
traditional contract interpretation. In any event, surely one could construct
a case to support the proposition that the subsequent conduct of the parties
can amend a contractual term.
270
275 Supra notes 265 and 268.
2 7 60 For the legal impact of this decision see: S.K.D. Mfg. Ltd. (1969), 20 LA.C.
231 (Weiler).
278 67 C.L.L.C. 14,047 (O.H.C.S. 1967) aff'd by 68 C.L.L.C. 14,098 (O.C.A,
1968).
279 See the cases outlined in Summers, supra note 54; Farnsworth, supra note 58.
However a collective agreement must be in writing, and hence re-sale must be made to
the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.
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Section s. 37 (7) (c) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act gives an
arbitration board power:
(c) to accept such oral or written evidence as the arbitrator or the arbitration
board, as the case may be, in its discretion deems proper, whether admis-
sible in a court of law or not.
However Mr. Justice Jessup saw this provision as only relaxing
the strict rules as to the admissibility of evidence and in particular allowed
hearsay evidence to be adduced without objection. However, that provision does
not relieve a board from acting only on evidence having cogency in law.
The "reasoning" allows any Ontario court to characterize the wording
of a collective agreement as unambiguous and thereby upset an award if
background data has been resorted to. This imposes an onerous burden on
the draftsmen of collective agreements. The United States Supreme Court
requested clarity in drafting restrictive arbitration provisions. The Canadian
courts impose this burden upon the drafting of all contract provisions.
The differences between a collective bargaining agreement and a com-
mercial contract were noted above. It was argued that the differences were
not so great as to render adjudication ineffective. A purposive approach to
interpretation having due regard to the industrial relations background could
accommodate the symbiotic relationship of the parties, the eleventh hour
bargaining pressure, the skeletal nature of the agreements and the exigencies
of the industrial setting, within an adjudicative institution. However the
Canadian courts have rejected these differences by quashing awards which
consider them. Arbitration is forced to proceed in a mechanistic fashion
replicating Anglo-Canadian judging.
Even aside from the evidentiary aspect of grievance arbitration, the
courts will intervene if the provisions of a collective agreement have been
given a meaning they cannot reasonably bear.2 0 This position is not unlike
that taken by the courts in those provinces which are said to have consensual
arbitration and this similarity is reflected in Mr. Justice Pennell's conclusion
in The Niagara Wire Weaving Co. Ltd. v. United Steelworkers of America
Local 4528281
The powers of the board of arbitration are those conferred upon it by the col-
lective agreement, namely, to interpret and apply the terms of the collective
agreement. The majority, it seems to me, disregarded the plain unambiguous
words of article 12.03 and read into the agreement terms which do not exist. It
is true the board of arbitration is master in its own household, but it cannot
exercise a jurisdiction which was never conferred upon it.
28oFalconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Weatherill, Ormsby et al and the United
Steelworkers, 70 C.L.L.C. 14,006 (O.C.A. 1970) and citing Re International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Flin Flon Lodge 1848 and Hudson Bay Mining
and Smelting Co. Ltd., [19681 S.C.R. 113, 118, 68 C.L.L.C. 14,069 (S.C.C. 1968); Ford
Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. v. International Union, U.A.W. and Weatherill, 70 C.L.L.C.
14,056 (S.C.O. 1970) (dictem); Kokotow Lumber Ltd. v. Shime, Irwin, Wren and the
Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Union, 70 C.L.L.C. 14,040 (O.S.C. 1970); Re Inter-
national Nickel Co. of Canada and United Steelworkers of America, 68 C.L.L.C.
14,127 (O.H.C.J. 1968). Of course this standard would not necessarily apply to an
arbitrator's interpretation of materials outside the collective agreement; assuming he has
the power to go outside (which is questionable). See note 287 supra.
281 69 C.LL.C. 14,228 (O.S.C. 1969).
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I am bound to say that in my respectful opinion the majority have based their
decision on an interpretation which cannot be reasonably maintained in the face
of the plain, unambiguous words of article 12.03. Accordingly there is an error
in law appearing on the face of the record. (emphasis added)
The chamelonic character attributed to the notion jurisdiction suggests
the house in which the arbitrator is a master may be as spacious or as minikin
as a reviewing court desires. At present it is of the Lilliputian variety. The
logic of jurisdiction when defined in the abstract and the multipurpose notion
euphemistically called an error of law on the face of the record prohibits
arbitrators from ignoring court rules of evidence,282 making common sense
assumptions in lieu of concrete evidence,2 83 considering mitigating factors in
discharge cases, 284 or developing an equitable doctrine of laches 285 or waiver
in relation to procedural provisions of the collective agreement.2 s8 Recently
the court has questioned the legitimacy of arbitral use of relevant statutory
material which may create horrendous problems in the not too distant
future.287 Other than an intuitive feeling of what a court will consider un-
reasonable little guidance of when a court will intervene is given to the
parties. But one certainty does exist. Whenever there is a doubt, it will be
resolved against grievance arbitration and this position creates a powerful
stimulus to litigate in the party disfavoured at arbitration. The result leaves
grievance arbitration barren of all the advantages that made it viable and
distinct from the courts. It is left as a mere staging platform to an inexpert
adjudication of a superior tribunal. To be sure, not all questions are brought
into the courts; but this has nothing to do with an amicable judicial doctrine.
The parties simply cannot afford to bring every question to the courts.
However any question that one of the parties considers important enough will
be reviewed if arbitration proves unsuccessful. The question for social design
and planning is whether this second opportunity is beneficial and necessary?
The position taken throughout this paper is that at present it is not. The
cases neglect the industrial relations realities, and cut against the institutional
282 Canadian Westinghouse Co. Ltd. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, 62 C.LL.C. 15,414 (O.H.C.S. 1968); Civic Employees Union v.
Municipality of Metro Toronto, 63 C.L.L.C. 15,445 (O.C.A. 1968); De Lavel Co. Ltd.
v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Kawartha Lodge
872, 69 C.L.L.C. 14,236 (O.S.C. 1969); International Moulders and Allied Workers'
Union v. Maxwell Ltd., 63 C.L.L.C. 15,481 (O.H.S.C. 1963). For what constitutes the
record see Abel, op. cit. supra note 234.
283 United Steelworkers of America, Local 4752 v. Burlington Steel Co., Division of
Slater Steel Industries Ltd., 69 C.L.LC. 14,206 (O.H.CJ. 1969).
284 R. v. Lane et al ex parte Green, 66 C.LL.C. 14,137 (O.H.CJ. 1966).
285 Ottawa Newspaper Guild, Local 205 and Bower v. The Ottawa Citizen, 66
C.L.L.C. 14,108 (O.H.CJ. 1965).
280 R. v. Weiler et al ex parte Union Carbide Canada Ltd., 68 C.L.L.C. 14137
(S.C.C. 1968), rev'g 68 C.L.L.C. 14,094; R. v. General Truck Drivers Union, Local
938 et al ex parte Hoar Transport, 69 C.L.L.C. 14,180 (S.C.C. 1969).
2871 If the arbitrator uses a statute and avoids the meaning of a collective agree-
ment his award will be quashed. See, International Chemical Workers Union v. Krever
et al, (1968), 68 C.L.L.C. 14,086 (Ont. H.C.); R.C.A. Victor Ltd. v. LW.A: (1971),
C.L.L.C. 14,099 (Ont. H.C.).
Yet if he neglects the presence of the statute and his award contravenes it, the
award will be quashed for illegality. See Re Bendix Automotive of Canada Ltd. and
U.A.W. Local 195, (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,089 (Ont. H.C.); (1971), 20 D.L.R.(3d)
151.
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capabilities of arbitration and the courts. More importantly, many of these
unconvincing outcomes are made academic by the length of time required
to process the claims.
To reiterate the theme of this paper, either a functional approach must
be accommodated within this concept of jurisdiction or an expert reviewing
body should be established. The industrial relations system with the inclusion
of the judiciary should be viewed as a collaborative framework with each
party and institution performing those tasks it does best. What it does best
is a function of its institutional capabilities. Presently Canadian courts are
not equipped to take a meaningful day to day role in the industrial enter-
prise. If the court is going to intervene it must define its role in a manner
to minimize the costs that are generated today. To do this, the court must
develop a presumption in favour of arbitration that can only be rebutted by
the clearest of evidence. Restrictive or limiting clauses on the arbitrator's
power must have an explicit and clear meaning in order to minimize the
possibility of interpretive error. The clearly wrong standard applied to arbitral
reasoning generally, must either be eliminated or applied by a more expert
body. The arbitrator has the power to be clearly wrong and only casuistry
turns this into jurisdictional errors or errors of law on the face of the record.
In any event a "clearly wrong" interpretation will not go completely un-
remedied. The arbitrator will not be used again and the error, admitting that
the bargaining onus will be shifted, can be corrected at the next bargaining
session. The arbitrators themselves can minimize the occurrence by develop-
ing consistent and rationally articulated approaches to interpretation.
288
Adjudicative Integrity
Court intervention to preserve the integrity of the adjudicative process
is both a necessary and correct application of the "calculus of intervention".
The courts have historically maintained the moral force of adjudication
through the use of doctrines such as the requirement of natural justice. This
intervention was justified above in relation to American courts and of course,
it applies equally in Canada. The gains of such intervention far out-weigh
any generated costs due to the court's expertise in these matters, and the
relatively little industrial relations experience required. This position obtains
in relation to both consensual and statutory arbitration.
In Bradley et al. v. Corporation of the City of Ottawa et al.25 9 certain
employees had been promoted by the Fire Chief in accordance with his
understanding of the seniority provisions of the collective agreement. The
Association filed a grievance on behalf of other employees who claimed
that they were entitled to these promotions instead. The arbitrator ruled in
favour of the Association, revoking the promotions in question. Those
employees prejudiced by the ruling, applied for certiorari to quash the award.
288 Conferences and the formation of bodies such as the National Arbitration
Association and American Arbitration Association are formalized mechanisms to achieve
a high standard of arbitral performance. Canada appears headed in this direction. See
the Ontario Labour-Management Arbitration Commission Act, S.O. 1968, c. 86 assented
to June 13, 1968 proclaimed in force January 16, 1970.
289 67 C.L.L.C. 14,043 (O.C.A. 1967).
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They asserted that they should have been given notice of the arbitration and
allowed to present argument. The Ontario Court of Appeal granted certio-
rari. Notice must be given to such employees to preserve the participation
of the party who is affected by the decision and adverse in interest. The
unarticulated major premise was that neither the employer nor the Association
could be expected to fairly represent the interests of these workers.
Hoogendorn v. Greening Metal Products and Screening Equipment Co.
et al.20° is another case illustrating this preservation of the adversary character
of grievance arbitration. The Supreme Court of Canada quashed an arbi-
tration award sanctioning the discharge of an employee who had refused to
pay union dues. In failing to give him notice and allow for his presence at
the hearing, the board had violated the rules of natural justice.
Grievance arbitration awards will be vacated or quashed in accord
with this same principle of adjudicatory integrity if an arbitrator interviews
witnesses or inspects documents in the absence of the parties;291 improperly
refuses to hear rebuttal evidence;292 proceeds in the absence of one of the
parties' counsel; 93 or if fraud or bias exist in the proceedings. 294 However in
the latter case, the standard of impartiality applied to the flanking arbitrators
of a tripartite board is substantially less than that applied to the chairman
or a lone arbitrator.295 Arbitration will not be affected in a situation such
as a work assignment dispute, where one of the parties (the other union)
would not be represented. 20 6 The labour relations board is a more appro-
priate instrument in resolving such a dispute.
200 67 C.L.L.C. 14,043 (S.C.C. 1967). See also Fisher v. Pemberton et al (1970),
8 D.L.R. (3d) 521; Paliare, Tilting Against the Windmill: The Individual's Right to
Arbitration, 8 Osgoode Hall L. 485 (1970); c.f. Carr, The Development of the Duty
of Fair Representation in Ontario, 6 Osgoode Hall LJ. 281 (1968). For a similar
approach taken by the Ontario Labour Relations Board see Boivan v. Plumbing Asso-
ciation, 1966 O.L.R.B. October Monthly Report 513.
It should be noted that a recent amendment to the Ontario legislation has created
(or codified) a duty of fair repreesntation of a trade union. R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 60.
201 City of Victoria v. Civic Employees Protection Association, 52 C.L.L.C. 15,036
(B.C.C.A. 1950); In reference Re Building Material, Construction and Fuel Truck
Drivers' Union, Local 213 and United Cartage Co. Ltd. (1956), 4 D.L.R. (2d) 98
(B.C.); R. v. Fine et alex parte Sheraton Ltd., 68 C.L.LC. 14,143 (O.H.CJ. 1968).
202 Trustees of the Ottawa Civic Hospital v. Canadian Union of Public Employees,
Local 576, 69 C.L.L.C. 14,230 (O.S.C. 1969).
293 Westeel Products Ltd., v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 3229, 65
C.L.L.C. 14,044 (B.C.S. 1964).
204 Re Arbitration Between International Union of Operating Engineers and Sague-
nay-Kitimat Co. (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 156 (B.C. S.C. 1957). The general test is that
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Szilard v. Szaz, [1955] S.C.R. 3, 6-7.
Fraud unravels all: Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, [1956] 1 All E.R. 341, 345 (C.A.
1956).
205 Compare Manitoba Teachers' Society (Flin Flon Dir) v. Flin Flon School
Division, 64 (3) C.L.L.C. 14,019 (M.Q.B. 1964); R. v. Board of Arbitration; ex parte
Cumberland Railway Co., 68 C.L.L.C. 14,121 (N.S.C.A. 1968) with Re Gainers Ltd.
and Local 319 United Packinghouse Workers of America, 64(3) C.L.L.C. 14,030
(A.S.C. 1964); Canadian Airline Pilots Association v. Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd., 66
C.L.L.C. 14,133 (B.C.C.A. 1966).
296 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Toiners v. Marwell Construction Co. Ltd.,
66 C.L.L.C. 14,115 (B.C. S.C. 1966); contrast this with the United States Supreme
Court ruling in Carey v. Westinghouse, supra note 132.
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Arbitrability in Canada
In contrast to the American analysis, there are very few cases that
deal with the issue of arbitrability. One reason for this is that four provinces,
including the two largest in terms of litigation, require that such issues be
determined by the arbitrator. The provinces are Alberta, British Columbia,
Newfoundland, and Ontario. Howeved these provisions have been held to
refer only to substantive arbitrability.297 In fact, the concept of procedural
arbitrability accepted by the United States Supreme Court in John Wiley
and Sons298 and left exclusively to the arbitrators, is not even acknowledged
in Canada. Mr. Justice Judson, in R. v. Weller et al ex parte Union Carbide
Canada Ltd.,299 held that section 37(1) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act
did not apply when the arbitrator had acted upon a grievance that appeared
to be procedurally barred by the collective agreement. The concept of juris-
diction was employed. If the grievance is "out of time" the arbitrator is
without jurisdiction. The arguments of industrial relations complexity and
arbitral expertise that the United States Supreme Court found so compelling
in John Wiley were not mentioned by the Court. Therefore in these four
jurisdictions arbitrability is an issue for the arbitrator to decide. However he
has no authority to decide erroneously. Should he hold a dispute to be
arbitrable and a court disagrees, it will be converted into an excess of
jurisdiction and the award quashed. 00 A fortiori, if he determines it is not
arbitrable and the court again disagrees, then this is a declination of juris-
diction.301 This provision expedites grievance arbitration. It avoids the issue
that confronts American courts so often before the award is rendered; but to
no ones' prejudice in that the Courts will always review the determination.302
However a very recent case falls closely within the American mould in
this area. In International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill
Workers, Local 742 v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd.303 an interloculatory
injunction was granted to a union restraining the company from contracting
297R. v. Weiler et al ex parte Union Carbide Canada Ltd., 68 C.L.L.C. 14,094
(S.C.C. 1968); R. v. General Truck Drivers Union, Local 938 et al ex parte Hoar
Transport Co. Ltd. 69 C.L.LC. 14,180 (S.C.C. 1969); contrast these cases with John
Wiley and Sons Inc. v. Livingston 376 U.S. 543 (1964); James B. Chambers v. Beaunit
Corp. 59 L.C. 13,071, 69 LR.R.M. 2732 (6th Cir. 1968).
298 Id.
299 Op cit., supra note 297.
00 The Board of School Trustees, School District No. 7 (New Brunswick) v. The
Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1088, 69 C.L.L.C. 14,235 (N.B. S.C.
1969); United Steel Corp. v. The United Steelworkers of America, Local 2776, [1958]
O.W.N. 105, 12 D.L.R. 2d 322 (O.H.CJ. 1958)
3 01 Re Sudbury Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union, Local 598, and Interna-
tional Nickel Company of Canada Ltd., 62 C.L.L.C. 15,417 (O.H.C.S. 1962); Re Prince
Rupert Fishermens' Co-op Assoc. et at, 68 C.L.L.C. 14,079 (B.C. S.C. 1968).
302This is a value judgment one must make: whether to force all grievances
through arbitration to maximize its therapeutic value while eliminating the costs of
judicial intervention. The United States Supreme Court in American and Warrior have
taken an intermediate position of entertaining the question in the light of a presumption
in favour of arbitration. Notably, in relation to procedural arbitrability they have
deferred exclusively and absolutely to arbitration, whereas the Canadian Courts have
gone in an opposite direction.
803 71 C.L.L.C. 14,076 (B.C. S.C. 1971).
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out work until after arbitration. The company claimed an absolute right to
contract out. The contract was silent on this issue and a management's right
clause did not exist. The court, citing the Steelworkers Trilogy, felt that. the
union had established a reasonable apprehended breach of the right asserted.
Another recent case in this area is Canadian Brotherhood of Railway
Transport and General Workers v. B.C. Air Lines Ltd. and Pacific Western
Airlines Ltd804 One airline took over another in a corporate merger. The
employees of the company taken over were given the choice of resignation
or to accept employment with no guarantee as to the terms. The new corpo-
ration viewed the existing collective agreement as not binding. The British
Columbia Supreme Court granted the union an interim injunction and ordered
arbitration. Mr. Justice Dohm, in a well reasoned and purposive judgment,
rejected the application of the common law doctrine requiring full notice of
contracts on the purchase of an enterprise.
In my opinion, ,the Courts of this country will not apply rigid common law
doctrines in the field of labour relations, in the face of what is plainly equitable,
reasonable and necessary if the law is to keep pace with modem industrial
relations.805
The nature of the collective agreement and the needs and realities of the
industrial context did not go unnoticed.
Insofar as a collective agreement and a marriage contract are both designed to
promote peace and order in the state they are similar. In my view a collective
agreement is more than an ordinary commercial contract and cannot be ap-
proached by simply applying the ordinary common law rules of contract.06
He referred to the American cases for guidance, citing John Wiley and
Sons with approval, concluding with the following statement:
The flexibility of the common law blended with equity has shown throughout
the centuries Judges have proved themselves at least as competent as Legislatives
in keeping the law abreast of the times.
It was urged upon me by counsel for the defendants that the request of the
plaintiff if granted would be making new law. I do not believe this to be so.
I am merely applying long-standing rules of equity to a new situation. However
even if it is new law then I must be guided by the great judgments in our law
that is never to shirk from accepting the logic Arid fairness of an argument merely
because it is novel.307
Conclusion
Few areas in Canadian law reflect the "arid legalism" so common to
judicial review of arbitration awards. The courts have forgone so many
opportunities to deal creatively with grievance arbitration in particular and
the industrial relations system in general that it is rather late in the day to
predict any change. Corrective measures break down into at least three
approaches. One is to encourage the courts to become acquainted with the
industrial relations system. Labour arbitration cases are reported presently
and this will become more extensive and sophisticated as time passes. A
804 70 C.L.L.C. 14,064 (B.C. S.C. 1970). Author notes that this case has recently
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ritualistic reading of these cases can only convince the courts that few issues
are unambiguous and clear if submitted for an arbitrator's decision. Hopefully
the courts would then implement the legislative policy in favour of grievance
arbitration by the creation of presumptions and standards of review which
favour arbitration and accommodate the institutional capacities of arbitrators
and judges. A second approach would be to preclude court intervention
completely or at least as complete as a privitive clause will permit. However,
it may be that grievance arbitration can no longer be viewed as a private
process. It may be that both parties desire the right of at least a "limited
appeal" on certain issues of major importance. Many collective agreements
involve widespread product and labour market implications. To leave this to
the "final and binding" decision of one or three individuals may no longer
be appropriate. A third and for the purposes of this conclusion the final
alternative, is the creation of an expert appeal body or labour court. This
institution would permit a review of major issues in the light of the needs
of the industrial relations system. At this time the implementation of the
second or third alternatives is unlikely and there is little indication that the
courts will embark along the course alternative one suggests without some
assistance and encouragement. Assistance can be given through well reasoned
arbitration awards and encouragement can be rendered by continued con-
structive criticism of the day to day intervention of the judiciary.
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